

PONTIFICIUM ATHENAEUM INTERNATIONALE « ANGELICUM »

LOUIS J. SECONDO, T. O. R.

THE RELATION OF HUMAN REASON TO
GOD'S NATURE AND EXISTENCE IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ST. BONAVENTURE

DISSERTATIO
AD LAUREAM
IN FACULTATE PHILOSOPHIAE
APUD PONTIFICIUM ATHENAEUM « ANGELICUM »
DE URBE

ROMAE - 1961

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Vidimus et approbavimus.

Romae, apud Pont. Athenaeum « Angelicum »,
die 3 mensis Decembris anni 1960

ATHANASIUS DE VOS, O.P.
CLEMENS VANSTEENKISTE, O.P.

Imprimi postest

IOANNES H. BOCCELLA, T.O.R.
Minister Generalis

Romae, die 2 Februarii 1961

Imprimatur

E Vicariatu Urbis, die 17 Februarii 1961

ALOYSIUS Card. *Provicarius*





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« Tanta bonae indolis honestate pollebat, ut magnus
ille magister, frater Alexander diceret aliquando
de ipso, quod in eo videbatur Adam non peccasse ».

*(Chronica XXIV generalium,
Analecta Franciscana, T. III, p. 324).*

CHAPTER I

THE SOURCES AND THE NATURE OF ST. BONAVENTURE'S PHILOSOPHY

The thirteenth century, rightly called by many the greatest of all centuries, was rich in its production of saints, scholars, philosophers and poets, artists and noble princes of the Church. Among the many who left their imprint on this great period may be numbered St. Bonaventure (John Fidanza), a saint and philosopher, a mystic and prince of Holy Mother Church. A son of St. Francis of Assisi and educated in the then great center of learning, the University of Paris, he was to absorb the influence of having been a devoted pupil of Alexander of Hales, of having witnessed the daring innovations in the field of philosophy propounded by St. Albert the Great and of having had at the same university as a fellow professor another great saint and philosopher, St. Thomas of Aquin (1).

(1) Cf. E. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, translated by Dom Iltyd and F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940), p. 6. In regard to the importance of the University of Paris from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries as the third great power of the West see: K. BIHLMAYER - H. TUECHLE, *Storia della Chiesa*, edizione italiana a cura di Igino Rogger (Brescia, Morcelliana, 1956), vol. II, pp. 351-352: « Dal XIII al XV secolo l'università di Parigi rappresentò, in certo modo, accanto al Sacerdotium (papato) e all'Imperium (impero) la terza grande potenza dell'Occidente ed ebbe anche spesso parte notevole nella politica. Per proteggere gli scolari da pericoli morali e per sostenere scolari indigenti, si istituirono anche le cosiddette borse (collegi, convitti, alunni). La più importante fondazione di questo genere a Parigi (1257) fu quella fondata da Roberto Sorbon, cappellano di corte di Luigi il Santo: dal nome del suo fondatore essa si chiamò la *Sorbona* ed acquistò tale importanza, che a partire del secolo XVI il suo nome si estese a tutta la facoltà teologica. Anche gli Ordini religiosi avevano per lo più a Parigi dei collegi propri, nei quali pure si teneva scuola ».

St. Bonaventure gave his lectures at Paris when the works and doctrine of Aristotle were gradually being introduced more and more in the traditional doctrine and many Arabian elements were leaving their imprint on the teachings of the schools. We may say that Alexander of Hales and his collaborators prepared the immediate ground for the work of St. Bonaventure by collecting an enormous amount of material and by constructing from these sources the work which has come down to us as the *Summa Alexandri* and which recent critical editions have thrown much light on this important thinker of the thirteenth century (2). It must not be thought, however, that the work of St. Bonaventure is merely the continuation of Alexander of Hales, for the Seraphic Doctor, although depending heavily on his former master, surpasses him in synthetic ability, in his clearness of thought and profundity of doctrine (3). Again, St. Bonaventure was greatly influenced by the immediate successors of Alexander and of these we may mention Odo Rigaldus (Eudes Rigaud) who succeeded John de la Rochelle in the government of Franciscan Studies at Paris and who also wrote a Commentary on the *Book of Sentences* (4).

(2) Cf. ALEXANDER DE HALÈS, *Summa Theologica* (4 vols., Quaracchi, Florentiae, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924-1948).

(3) Cf. M. DE WULF, *Storia della filosofia medievale* (Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1945), vol. II, p. 104. See also E. SMEETS, *Bonaventure (Saint)*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris, Letouzey et Ane, Editeurs, 1910), vol. II, p. 968: « Bonaventure, comme il le professe lui-même, in *IV Sent.*, 1, II, praeloc., a suivi généralement son maître Alexandre de Halès. Cependant il ne le reproduit pas avec servilité; sa doctrine est plus complète, plus claire, plus exact; il surpasse son maître tant par le style que par la sublimité des idées. On a prétendu parfois que Bonaventure avait copié quelques questiones des oeuvres d'Alexander de Halès. Est-il vrai qu'on puisse l'accuser de plagiat? Certainement non. La *Summa de virtutibus*, qu'on a attribuée autrefois à Alexandre, a pu donner occasion à l'erreur. Si cet ouvrage était authentique, Bonaventure aurait copié à peu près tout le traité des vertus théologiques dans le III livre des Sentences. Mais la *Summa de virtutibus* n'est pas d'Alexandre, elle est d'un auteur postérieur qui a utilisé des ouvrages de Saint Bonaventure ».

(4) A. TOGNOLO, *Eudes Rigaud*, in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, ed. Galarate, IV (1957), 128. For the life and works of Odo Rigaldus see also P. GLORIEUX, *Répertoire des maîtres en Théologie de Paris aux XIII Siècle* (Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1933), vol. II, pp. 31-33.

In studying any system of philosophy, one must take the doctrine propounded in its own light and setting and as such pass judgment on such a system, for the spirit that animates such a work and the starting point from which the doctrine springs will color and greatly influence any order of thought. To the merit of St. Bonaventure it must be said that he took the vast amount of material at his disposal, offered by Alexander and his collaborators, and synthesized it into what may be called the first mature expression of the older Franciscan School. In his philosophy are to be found Augustinian, Aristotelian, and Arabic elements. Although it is true to say that the Franciscan School, especially the older school, is characteristically Augustinian of which many elements are both evident and visible, this point must not be carried too far, because the thirteenth century does not know of a strictly Aristotelian or Augustinian School, but every system is more or less a mixture, or rather, a blend of the two. In passing one might take the systems offered and expounded by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Both are Doctors and canonized Saints of Holy Mother Church; both united in defending the articles of her sacred teaching, yet, because of their characteristically different formation and individuality, they will never vision the same problem in the same way. It is then with the philosophy of St. Bonaventure that we are interested and in the system developed by him we wish to study precisely one point, namely, the relation of human reason to God's nature and existence. The question revolves around the point: How can finite reason know the being who is infinite? In developing the answer to this question, we shall touch upon many of the teachings of the seraphic Doctor gathered from his:

(a) *Commentarii in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, composed between 1250-1254 (5);

(5) « This commentary is a theological achievement of the first rank, and remains without doubt Bonaventure's greatest work. All his other writings are in some way subservient to it. It comprises four thousand pages in folio, and traverses the entire field of scholastic theology. Like the other medieval *summae*, it is divided into four books. In the first, second, and fourth, Bonaventure compares favorably with the best commentaries on the Sentences, while it is admitted that in the third he

(b) *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi, de mysterio SS. Trinitatis, de perfectione evangelica*, written before 1256;

(c) *Breviloquium*, written about 1257 and rightly called a brief *Summa Theologica*;

(d) *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, composed in 1259, a mystical work, characteristic of the spirit of St. Bonaventure;

(e) *De reductione artium ad theologiam*, seemingly an early work of the Saint and called by De Wulf a classification of human knowledge (6);

(f) *De donis Spiritus Sancti*, written in 1268;

(g) *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, conferences given at Paris in 1273 and gathered by his listeners (7).

St. Bonaventure has been rightly called the staunch defender of Christian Wisdom. At the time of his teaching at the University of Paris, the averroistic influence with its doctrine of the separation of reason and faith was being strongly felt. Against this movement St. Bonaventure strongly fought, for to him there could be no other true wisdom or knowledge, save that which had its origin and foundation in Christ. This is the real and ultimate perfection of man. In

surpasses all others... The first impression we obtain is that which the chronicle notes, that 'he made every truth a prayer to God and a praise of God' » (LUDGER WEGEMER, O.F.M., *St. Bonaventure. The Seraphic Doctor - His Life and Works*, in *Franciscan Studies*, II (July, 1924), p. 16. See also E. SMEETS, *Bonaventure (Saint)*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, *op. cit.*, p. 975: « Parmi les ouvrages scholastiques de Bonaventure, le commentaire sur les livres des Sentences occupe la première place. Tout ce que le saint écrit plus tard se rapporte en grand partie à ce commentaire comme à sa source principale et à son solide fondement. C'est dans ce commentaire qu'il a expliqué les questions philosophiques et théologiques agitées de son temps, avec tant d'abondance et de profondeur que les écrivains postérieurs n'ont qu'une voix pour louer et exalter cette oeuvre magistrale ». M. GRABMAN, *Geschichte der kath. theol.*, Freiburg, 1933, p. 67: « Der Sentenzenkommentar Bonaventuras ist vielleicht der inhaltlich bedeutendste Sentenzenkommentar der Scholastik ».

(6) Cf. M. DE WULF, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

(7) The dates of these works are taken from L. VEUTHEY, *Bonaventura* (s.), in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, ed. Gallarate, I (1957), 745, and they are in general accord with the dates given by P. GLORIEUX, *op. cit.*, except that Glorieux gives the dates of the composition of the *Commentary on the Four Books of the Sentences* as 1250-1252.

Christ are to be found the treasures of wisdom and knowledge of the hidden God, for Christ Himself is the medium of all sciences (8). Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, and other philosophers did not reach this goal, for they did not rightly understand the true condition of man, his endless search for beatitude, the effects of original sin, the relation between body and soul, and the correct value of human merits. Not knowing the true cause from whence springs human misery and not knowing the true physician capable of healing this misery, they were not able to attain the goal of Christian wisdom (9). Aristotle was interested in the sensible world, caring but little for the realities of the world beyond the sensible and hence when he endeavored to explain this higher world, he arrived at conclusions harmful to Christian faith. His aim is science and the delight to be found therein (10). Plato more interested in the world beyond the sensible fixed his attention on a higher and eternal world and thus neglected the contingent. He sacrificed science for wisdom (11). Even Plotinus, whom St. Bonaventure gives the name *Ille Nobilissimus* and who spoke so nobly

(8) « *Propositum igitur nostrum est ostendere, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi, et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum* » (In *Hexaemeron*, I, 11, T. V, p. 331).

(9) « *Haec ergo est medicina, scilicet gratia Spiritus sancti. Hunc medicum et hanc gratiam philosophia non potest attingere. Quid ergo gloriaris, qui nescis per scientiam tuam nec infirmitatem tuam nec eius causam nec medicum nec medicinam? Isti philosophi habuerunt pennas struthionum, quia affectus non erant sanati nec ordinati nec rectificati; quod non fit nisi per fidem. Unde primo posuerunt falsam beatitudinis circulationem; secundo, falsam praesentium meritum sufficientiam; tertio internarum virium perpetuam incolumitatem. In has tres tenebras inciderunt* » (In *Hexaemeron*, VII, 11-12, T. V, p. 367). Cf. F. TINIVELLA, *De impossibili sapientiae adeptione in philosophia pagana juxta Collationes in Hexaemeron S. Bonaventurae*, in *Antonianum*, XI (1936), 27-50; 135-186; 277-318.

(10) « *Haec autem est Scriptura, ubi non unum, sed multa inveniuntur, in quibus est delectatio spiritualis. In hac sola scientia est delectatio, non in aliis. Philosophus dicit, quod magna delectatio est scire, quod diameter est asymeter costae* » (in *Hexaemeron*, XVII, 7, T. V., p. 410).

(11) « *Unde quia Plato totam cognitionem certitudinalem convertit ad mundum intelligibilem sive idealem, ideo merito reprehensus fuit ab Aristotele; non quia male diceret ideas esse et aeternas rationes, cum eum in hoc laudet Augustinus; sed quia, despecto mundo sensibili, totam certitudinem cognitionis reducere voluit ad illas ideas* » (*Christus, Unus Omnium Magister*, Sermo IX, No. 18, T. V, p. 572).

of the nature and origin of the virtues did not attain this true wisdom because he did not know the true nature of man (12). This true wisdom was realized in St. Augustine, the interpreter of Sacred Scripture, who know how to combine wisdom and science and to place all things in their proper place and in their relation to God (13).

St. Bonaventure defines what he means by wisdom and gives four definitions of the term: 1) Wisdom taken in a common sense and as such it is the general cognition of things, or according to the definition given by St. Augustine and Aristotle: « Wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human » (14). In this sense it seems that we can identify wisdom with philosophy (15). Wisdom may be taken in a less common sense and as such it is said to be not any cognition whatsoever but a sublime one, namely, the cognition of eternal things. Following again St. Augustine and Aristotle, it seems that in this meaning we can identify wisdom with metaphysics or first philosophy. 2) The third is wisdom in the proper sense and it means a cognition of God according to piety. It is the worship given to God by faith, hope, and charity. 3) Lastly, wisdom may be understood in a more proper sense and it means the experimental cognition of God. As such it is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, the act of which consists in tasting the divine sweetness. It is evident that this wisdom belongs to the mystical state, for it begins in cognition and ends in affection (16). Wisdom in this last sense is the goal and the end of St. Bonaventure's life and work; he may call it by various names such as *pax, quaedam ignorantia docta*.

(12) Cf. *In Hexaemeron*, VII, 3, T. V, p. 365 sq.

(13) « Uterque autem sermo, scilicet sapientiae et scientiae, per Spiritum sanctum datus est Augustino, tamquam praecipuo expositori totius Scripturae, satis excellenter, sicut ex scriptis eius apparet » (*Christus, Unus Omnium Magister*, No. 19, *loc. cit.*). In the writings of St. Bonaventure the quotations from St. Augustine are very numerous, next in numbers to his quotations from Holy Scripture. Cf. *Opera Omnia*, T. X, pp. 267-269.

(14) *In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. u., q. 1, T. III, p. 774; St. Augustine, *De Trin.*, XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (*PL* 42, 1037); Aristotle, *Lib. I*, c. 2 (II, 70).

(15) St. AUGUSTINE, *loc. cit.*; Aristotle, *Ethicor.*, VI, c. 7; *Methaph.*, I, c. 1 et 2 (II, 70, 469 sq.).

(16) *In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. u., q. 1, T. III, p. 774.

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charitas, etc., yet for him it means but one thing, namely, knowledge by tasting (17). It is the ultimate purpose of man's life here on earth. These thoughts are to be found throughout his writings, yet in particular are they placed in evidence in his *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* and his *De reductione artium ad theologiam*. It is in this latter work that he clearly shows how all sciences are connected with theology and through theology to the mystical union (18).

From what has been written, it is evident that in the system developed by St. Bonaventure philosophy has as its immediate aim the duty of leading man to God. Although philosophy and theology must not be separated from each other, the Seraphic Doctor distinguishes between the two and states that philosophy is a science in its own right. He defines philosophy as the knowledge that man can acquire by means of reason alone (19). Philosophy is based on the principles of reason, theology on the principles of faith (20). In his *De*

(17) Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 24, dub. 4, T. III, p. 531.

(18) « No thirteenth century thinker set himself more systematically to reduce the sciences to theology and put them entirely at its service; and no one took more literally than he the mission entrusted by the Popes to the University of Paris: *theologia imperat aliis ut domina et illae sibi ut famulae obsequuntur* » (E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 481).

(19) « *Philosophia quidem agit de rebus, ut sunt in natura, seu in anima secundum notitiam naturaliter insitam, vel etiam acquisitam; sed theologia, tamquam scientia supra fidem fundata et per Spiritum sanctum revelata, agit et de eis quae spectant ad gratiam et gloriam et etiam ad Sapientiam aeternam* » (*Breviloquium*, prol., n. 3, T. V, p. 205).

(20) « *Quaedam est quae consistit in intellectu pure speculativo; et haec est fundata super principia rationis, et haec est scientia acquisita de quacumque creatura, sicut scientia humanae philosophiae* » (*In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. u. q. 2, T. III, p. 776).

« Non è vero pertanto che Bonaventura non sia un filosofo, ma solo un teologo ed un mistico; che non riconosca il valore della ragione e della filosofia in se; che sia filosoficamente scettico e che non distingua la filosofia dalla teologia. La verità è che Bonaventura non *separa* la filosofia dalla teologia, come non *separa*, nell'Uomo, la natura dalla soprannatura, nè, in generale, l'essere dal Dio concreto, ragione di ogni essere, che la ragione sola non può riconoscere in se. Ma egli *distingue* molto bene il campo naturale dal campo soprannaturale. Per Bonaventura la filosofia si distingue dalla teologia: a) secondo l'*obiectum formale quo*: la filosofia è fondata sulla *ragione*, "est fundata super principia rationis"; la teologia invece sulla *fede*: "fundatur supra principia fidei et habet ortum a dono gratiae" (*In III Sent.*, a. u., q. 2, concl.; III, p. 776); b) secondo l'*obiectum formale quod*: l'oggetto della

reductione artium ad theologiam, he states that philosophy, dealing with the inner and ultimate cause of things, is the highest form of man's intellectual activity. Here he gives his division of philosophy into natural, rational, and moral, according as this science considers the truth of speech, the truth of things, and the truth of morals. Natural philosophy is divided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics and corresponds to God as the cause of being; rational philosophy is divided into grammar, logic, and rhetoric and has reference to God as the cause of understanding; moral philosophy treats of the moral and intellectual virtues and is further divided into individual, family, and social ethics. Moral philosophy corresponds to God as the order of life (21). The Seraphic Doctor states that his division of philosophy is natural and not established by the philosophers but is one according to truth (22).

St. Bonaventure would have natural reason aid theology, for the light of reason also comes from God. He well understood that speculation and research in the meaning and truth of terms gives the highest possible certitude to man here on earth, surpassing even that of faith (23). Yet philosophy, if it be left to itself, cannot reach far, especially in seeking the truths concerning God and the relation of the world to God. Aristotle himself was aware of this, as he asserts that although the knowledge of divine things is more noble than that of the science of mathematics, yet greater is the certitude of mathematical science over that of divine things (24). Science, unless it is helped by faith, can attain but little cognition of divine things; that which is seen by the eye of faith can be most obscure for science. Many important questions, such as the power and wisdom of God, the creation of the world, etc., were hidden from the philosophers, yet made known to simple and believing souls. The Saint quotes the

filosofia est verum visum, l'oggetto della teologia est *verum non visum* » (L. VEUTHEY, *Bonaventura* (s.), in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, ed. Gallarate, I (1957), p. 746).

(21) *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, 4, T. V, p. 320.

(22) *In Hexaemeron*, IV, 2, T. V, p. 349.

(23) *In III Sent.*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 4, T. III, p. 482.

(24) *Ibid.*, q. 4, ad 5, p. 483.

words of St. Paul: «Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?» (I Cor. 1:20), and affirms that all knowledge of God in this life without faith is rather foolishness than true science. Such knowledge leads one into error, except it is guided and helped by the light of faith; whence by faith, science is not expelled but greater helped (25). Thus philosophy can proceed in two ways, either helped by the guiding principle of faith or according to the principles of reason alone. In the first instance, it will be greatly helped in its search for truth; this is the method adopted by the Catholic doctors and faithful of the Church. In the second case, philosophy will fall into error, as has been manifested by the philosophers who proceeded without the guiding light of faith and who did not rightly understand the condition of man in this life. Hence their philosophy could only be one of a fallen nature (26).

Aided by the guiding light of faith, philosophy now becomes a stepping-stone for man in his return to God. It becomes an integral part of a great organized system of knowledge, leading finally to the purpose and the end of man's existence here on earth, namely, the mystical union. Philosophy stands between simple faith and theology, as theology has its place mid-way between philosophy and the gift of contemplation, which contemplation is a passage between theology and the light of glory (27). Thus philosophy as all science is for St. Bonaventure part of the journey of the soul to God which will end in the mystical union, so beautifully shown in his *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*. This goal, the sweetness of the union with God, the ancient philosophers promised but they never reached. It was for them a search in vain (28). In conclusion then, it is evident that the philosophy of St. Bonaventure, while forming a part of his ideal of Christian wisdom was deeply and greatly influenced by Neo-Platonism and in particular by St. Augustine. It was through St. Augustine that many ideas of the noble Plotinus found their place in the

(25) *In III Sent.*, d. 24, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4, T. III, p. 524.

(26) *In II Sent.*, d. 30, a. 1, conc., T. II, p. 716.

(27) *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, IV, 3 sq., T. V, p. 474.

(28) *In Hexaemeron*, V, 32-33, T. V, p. 359. Cf. P. BOEHNER, O.F.M., *History of Franciscan Philosophy* (manuscript) St. Bonaventure, pp. 33-47.

doctrine of St. Bonaventure. One need but refer to the theory of illumination, to his ideas about the hierarchy, and the return to God. Yet St. Bonaventure did not depend exclusively upon the Neo-Platonic tradition: it was his great gift to organize his system of philosophy according to a religious ideal and in the pursuit of this ideal he gratefully accepted his material from many sources; many details he took from Aristotle (29); his inspiration came from the Platonic tradition; the spirit of his labours had their source in the highest form of Christian thought.

(29) Cf. ANGELICO DA VINCA, *Atteggiamento di S. Bonaventura verso Aristotele e la filosofia. L'aspetto filosofico dell'aristotelismo di S. Bonaventura*, in *Collect. Franc.*, XIX (1949), pp. 5-44.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE AND DIGNITY OF MAN

Man is the noblest being in God's terrestrial creation. To him has been given the tremendous powers of intelligence and volition, faculties which enable him to think and to will and by means of which he fulfills the very purpose for which he was created. Endowed with such powers, man chooses means to an end and further selects the precise end toward which he will act. He alone of God's terrestrial creation knows why he acts. Composed of body and soul, he unites in himself the two worlds, the world of spirit and the world of matter, for this noble creature has being with the stars, he lives with the plants, feels with the animals, and has intelligence with the angels. He is in truth a lesser world, a microcosm. For him all things were made and so it is fitting, as the Seraphic Doctor maintains man should bear a relation to the things which he needs and upon which he depends (1). Yet it is ultimately because of his rational nature that man is elevated to such a noble peak.

It can be truthfully stated that man's body is a noble creation of God. Although there are other creatures which, according to their material composition, in some respects surpass man, and we may mention the wonderful sense of smell, of hearing, of touch, which some animals possess, nevertheless, in its totality it must be held with St. Bonaventure that the human body is the most noble organization in created

(1) « Cum enim homo sit minor mundus, propter quem omnia facta sunt, debet habere naturalem conformitatem ad mundum maiorem, qui propter ipsum factus est a sua primaria conditione » (*In II Sent.*, d. 30, q. 1, T. II, p. 715).

nature (2). Yet it is because of his rational nature that man is elevated, ennobled, and receives the dignity which is his, for as the Seraphic Doctor so well states: «The soul is the perfection of a body born to be vivified by a rational soul» (3). Thus we wish to study St. Bonaventure's teaching on the soul and its faculties of intellect and will, which will give us an ever deeper understanding of the term «reason» as used by the Seraphic Doctor.

The Soul of Man.

The soul of man is a simple spiritual substance (4) and a self-subsistent form (5). It is the form or perfection of the body and is united to the body as its mover (6); as a substance it is the perfection of the body and by means of its faculties it moves the body (7). This spiritual soul is endowed with faculties which place at its disposal external matter—such as giving life to the body—and internal faculties, memory, intellect, and will. In a word, the soul is subject to potency and act with all the possibilities of contingency and development. The soul has being, life, and intelligence, and it imparts these to the body. It enjoys liberty. The soul was created by God and is destined to live forever; it is immortal (8).

Since the body is a most noble creation, it must be united to another noble form, namely the soul, the substantial form of the body (9). As long as this union exists, the body is vi-

(2) *In II Sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, T. II, p. 49 sq.

(3) «*Anima... est perfectio corporis nati vivificari vita rationali*» (*In II Sent.*, d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3, p. 82).

(4) «*Necesse est etiam, quod sit substantia spiritualis et incorporea, ac per hoc simplex, omni carens dimensione quantitativa*» (*Breviloquium*, II, 6).

(5) «*Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, tenens... quod anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod habet intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium materiale, a quo habet existere, et formale a quo habet esse*» (*In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, II, pp. 414-415).

(6) *Breviloquium*, II, 9, T. V, p. 227; *Comment. in Eccl.*, III, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2 ad 2, 3, T. VI.

(7) *In IV Sent.*, d. 44, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2 ad 3, p. 914.

(8) *Breviloquium*, II, 9, p. 227.

(9) *In II Sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 3, p. 50.

vified by the soul. Once it ceases, the body disintegrates. The soul naturally seeks to inform the body. It perfects the body, yet the soul is not the *forma corporeitatis* but an act of the body already organized (10). St. Bonaventure states that the soul is a substance composed of matter and form; union with the body is not required to constitute the soul as a substance, for the soul is already a *hoc aliquid*. This doctrine follows from the fact that, according to the Seraphic Doctor, all creatures, whether spiritual or corporeal, are composed of matter and form. In spiritual beings the matter is called a spiritual matter. There must be such matter, St. Bonaventure states, because there must be a subject which is the recipient of the accidental changes that take place in the soul. The form is not the subject of accidents. Hence it must be a material principle that is the subject of these accidents, when the soul passes from potency to act. It must be remembered here that the matter spoken of is a spiritual matter, a matter without extension; it is the foundation of change and potentiality. Only when this matter receives a corporeal form does it become extended (11). We might study here briefly this matter of which the Seraphic Doctor speaks.

St. Bonaventure, following in the tradition of his master and teacher, Alexander of Hales, maintains that both angels and rational souls are composed of two principles, namely, matter (spiritual) and form (12). He admits the commonly

(10) *Ibid.*

(11) Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, p. 413 sq.; *ibid.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, qq. 2, 3, p. 94 sq.

(12) « Jede geschaffene Einzelsubstanz ist zusammengesetzt aus Form und Materie. Dieser binarius materiae et formae findet sich auch in den geschaffenen Geistwesen, d.h. im Engel und in der Menschenselle. Die Zusammensetzung aus Form und materie fällt nicht zusammen mit der aus quo est und quod est, die daneben beibehalten wird, sondern ist stärker als sie. Sie ist identisch mit der Zusammensetzung aus Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit. Form und Materie sind aufeinander bezogen; sie vereinigen sich durch sich selbst, ohne Bindeglied. Aus der Vereinigung beider entsteht eine volle substanz, ein Einzelwesen. Obwohl beide nur Teilsubstanzen und darum in Wirklichkeit nie getrennt sind, lässt sich doch jede für sich betrachten » (P. BISSELS, *Die Lehre von der materia spiritualis in der Scholastik*, in *Franziskanische Studien*, Dietrich - Coelde - Verlag - Worl/Westf., pp. 242-243. This work offers an interesting study of the teaching of the question of spiritual matter during the period of scholasticism.

accepted compositions to be found in every creature, that is, its being and dependence, its substance and power, its acts and potency, its genus and difference, the *quo est* and the *quod est* of every creature, but also holds that there must be a fifth composition, namely matter and form (13). He offers three reasons for his position taken from: a. the mutability of all creatures; b. the individuality of every creature; c. the essential composition of each creature which may be stated in the following manner.

The mutability of every creature requires a material or potential principle. This is proven in a special way by the Saint for the angels but can hold for any creature. The mutability of the angel is a known fact and states the Seraphic Doctor following St. Augustine (14) that the principle of this mutability must be matter, for everything which changes looks to a certain «informity» according to which a form is either received, changed or transformed.

The individuality of every creature requires a material principle. According to the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, individuation is due partly to matter and partly to form and it is the union of both of these principles that constitutes the individual as such (15). Thus since everything that has been

(13) Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, I, p. 167. In regard to the angel see: *In II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, II, p. 91: «Cum in angelo sit ratio mutabilitatis non tantum ad non-esse, sed secundum diversas proprietates, sit iterum ratio individuationis et limitationis, postremo ratio essentialis compositionis secundum propriam naturam: non video causam nec rationem, quomodo defendi potest, quin substantia angeli sit composita ex diversis naturis; et si composita est ex diversis naturis, illae duae naturae se habent per modum actualis et possibilis, et ita materiae et formae. Et ideo illa positio videtur verior esse, scilicet quod in angelo sit compositio ex materia et forma». In regard to the rational soul confer: *In II Sent.*, d. 17, «Animam tamen rationalem dixerunt habere compositionem ex quo est et quod est, quia ipsa est hoc aliquid et nata est per se et in se subistere. Sed cum planum sit, animam rationalem posse pati et agere et mutari ab una proprietate in aliam et in se ipsa subsistere, non videtur, quod illud sufficiat dicere, quod in ea sit tantum compositio ex quo est et quod est, nisi addatur esse in ea compositio materiae et formae».

(14) *Conf.*, XII, c. 19, n. 28.

(15) «Ideo est tertia positio satis planior, quod individuatōe consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum; sicut patet, cum impressio vel expressio fit multorum sigillorum in cera, quae prius erat una, nec sigilla pluri-

created, including the angel, is individual, everything must have a material principle which is in part the cause of its individuality.

The essential composition of all created things looks to a material principle, for all creatures, the angel included, may be defined by its genus and specific difference. The former, the genus, is a principle of potentiality which makes a being common to many; the latter, the specific difference is a principle of actuality by which a being is distinguished from many. Thus the former is related to matter, while the latter looks to form (16).

To understand correctly St. Bonaventure's teaching on this spiritual matter two things must be considered attentively; first, the matter which he attributes to spiritual substances is postulated on metaphysical grounds and therefore is concerned with every created being. As a consequence this matter of the metaphysician is the same in all created beings and differs from the matter which the physicist studies and investigates in a narrower sense as the subject of generation and corruption and motion and which he attributes to bodies alone (17). Secondly, the Doctor of the Franciscan School, basing his position on metaphysical reasons for the hylomorphic composition of all creatures, finds in this theory the satisfaction of his religious tendencies as well, for here once again he is seeking the glory of God, though not in the unfair way or manner sometimes attributed to him by historians.

ficari possunt sine cera, nec cera numeratur, nisi quia fiunt in ea diversa sigilla. Si tamen quaeras, a quo veniat principaliter; dicendum, quod individuum est hoc aliquid, quod sit hoc, principaliter habet a materia; ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore. Quod sit aliquid, habet a forma, individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae. Individuatio igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio» (*In II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, II, p. 109).

(16) Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, II, p. 89.

(17) «Metaphysicus considerat naturam omnis creaturae, et maxime substantiae per se entis, in qua est considerare et actum essendi, et hunc dat forma; et stabilitatem per se existendi, et hanc dat et praestat illud, cui innititur forma; hoc est materia» (*In II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, II, p. 97). See also: *In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, II, p. 415: «Illa autem materia sublevata est supra esse extensionis, et supra esse privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis».

His religious feelings and deep faith did not blind or dim his great intellect but only rendered him more careful in all his teachings. Deeply convinced and strongly impressed by the reverence which is due to God whose simplicity is infinitely removed from that of all creatures, he gladly and willingly accepted a thesis which, although it was disputed among theologians, nevertheless, recommended itself to him, because it excluded the possibility of attributing to any creature that which belonged to God alone, namely, pure actuality (18).

St. Bonaventure made his own the words: *Attribuere quod est Dei creaturae periculosum est* and this thought underlies his whole system of philosophy. It is for this reason that the world could not be eternal, why angels had also to be composed of matter, why a form could not be had from matter without there pre-existing seminal reasons for this form, why human knowledge needed an illumination as an absolute foundation in its search for truth, why philosophy needed the guiding light of faith, why virtue must be sustained by grace, why nature itself in order to be complete must have the immediate and special concurrence of God. The conservative position of the Seraphic Doctor is understandable, when one appreciates his anxiety to protect the tenets of faith from unjust innovators in philosophy or religion. His doctrine manifests one fundamental tendency: « One cannot place God in the center of thought without taking account of His presence every time one thinks, and the Christian soul judges of things only in relation to God » (19).

(18) P. BOEHNER, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, op. cit., pp. 56-59. Cf. L. VEUTHEY, *Bonaventura* (s.), in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, op. cit., p. 755: « Ogni essere esiste in una tensione dinamica della potenza all'atto e si distingue dall'atto puro per il fatto stesso della sua composizione di potenza e d'atto. Ora il principio della potenza è la materia, mentre il principio dell'atto è la forma. Dunque, mentre Dio è forma pura, atto puro, ogni essere fuori di Dio sarà invece composto di materia e di forma, cioè di potenza e di atto. Negare questa composizione sarebbe cadere nel panteismo secondo la logica stessa del sistema... La materia è essenzialmente un principio metafisico. Diventerà spirituale o corporale secondo la semplicità o invece la composizione fisica dell'essere in cui entrerà come principio costitutivo ».

(19) E. GILSON, op. cit., p. 476.

To return to St. Bonaventure's teaching on the soul is to state once again that the soul is a complete substance, uniting with another complete substance, the body, to form the human composite of body and soul. Such a union is an *unum per se* and not an *unum per accidens*. To the objection as to how two complete principles can unite to form one substantial composition, the Seraphic Doctor answers that this is possible in the case where both have appetites to be fulfilled and satisfied. The soul already complete with its spiritual matter has not been wholly satisfied and thus is drawn to a matter in which all its potentialities can be developed; in brief, it is drawn to inform organized flesh. The same is true of the body; containing its own matter and form, it is nevertheless, desirous of being informed by the soul and thus constitutes the human composite, man (20). This union of body and soul is natural and substantial (21), joining both body and soul together as matter and form (22). There exists between them a natural aptitude and inclination, rendering them both dependent of each other. It is true that the soul can exist without the body, yet because of this inclination toward the body, the soul is dependent upon the body as form depends upon its matter (23). This inclination is so strong, states St. Bonaventure, that even the Blessed Souls long to be reunited with their proper bodies and until this union does not take place they are not perfectly happy (24).

(20) « Ad illud quod obicitur, quod compositum ex materia et forma est ens completum, et ita non venit ad constitutionem tertii; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum generaliter, sed tunc, quando materia terminat omnem appetitum formae, et forma omnem appetitum materiae; tunc non est appetitus ad aliquid extra, et ita nec possibilitas ad compositionem, quae praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem. Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habet ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est, et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendam animam » (*In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2 ad 6, II, pp. 415-416).

(21) *Ibid.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2, concl., p. 50.

(22) *Breviloquium*, VII, 5, T. V, p. 286: « Completio vero naturae requirit, ut homo constet simul ex corpore et anima tanquam ex materia et forma, quae mutuam habent appetitum et inclinationem mutuam ».

(23) *In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 3 ad 4, p. 418; *ibid.*, ad 5.

(24) *Breviloquium*, VII, 7, T. V, p. 289; *Soliloquium*, c. 4, n. 21, VIII, p. 64.

We may thus summarize the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor regarding the relation of soul and body in the following manner: (1) There are in man two constituent principles, each complete in its own genus but incomplete in respect to the perfection which regards their composition. (2) Each of these two principles is composed of matter and form. Yet each seeks the other through a natural appetite which is inherent in both. (3) Although each of these constituent principles is complete in its own genus, nevertheless, from the union of the two a new complete substance results. Such is our Saint's teaching on the soul of man, a complete principle, created by God to live forever. Here we may add a word on the immortality of the soul.

The Immortality of the Soul.

St. Bonaventure states that «immortality is the same as the potency or aptitude for not dying» (25), and even though the soul, a simple substance and a subsistent form (26), is of its nature capable of existing permanently, yet it is the gratuitous influence of God which preserves its being (27). In the *Second Book of the Sentences*, distinction nineteen, article one, question one, St. Bonaventure treats specifically of the immortality of the soul. In this article the Seraphic Doctor shows that he is well aware and cognizant of the many proofs that have been deduced to prove the immortality of the soul and refers to them. Such arguments would be based on the perfection of the order of the universe, the requirements of divine justice, a consideration of the cognitive and affective faculties of the human soul, the soul's progress in knowledge, etc. Yet, while discussing and adopting these proofs, he does not make them exclusively his own. He has a preference for other proofs, drawn from the fact that the human soul

(25) *In II Sent.*, d. 19, a. 3, q. 2, p. 469.

(26) *Ibid.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, p. 452.

(27) «Quia Deus se ipso permanet, anima autem, etsi de sui natura sit ad permanendum idonea, tamen nunquam permaneret nisi conservaretur per gratuitam Dei influentiam» (*In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 ad 5, p. 412).

is a complete substance, composed of matter and form. For him the immortality of the soul can be shown from its fourfold genus of causality, namely, by its formal cause, material cause, efficient cause, and lastly by its final cause. This may be stated as follows.

Because the form of which the soul is composed has been made to participate in divine beatitude in which consists the highest good, it has been made capable of God and therefore created into the image and similitude of God. If it is the image of God, it is expressly assimilated to God. Such it would not be, if it were to be dissolved by death or condemned to perish. Hence the soul will not die. The matter which is united to this form of such a noble dignity longs and seeks to be joined to no other form. It is wholly satisfied and satiated and could ask nothing else of its form, because that which perfects it carries the express image of God. The Creator who has made such a perfect union of this matter and form in creating the soul out of nothing does not wish to dissolve it but maintains and conserves it in being. The most cogent, however, of these proofs is seen from the end for which the human soul was created, namely eternal happiness, and in support of this truth the Seraphic Doctor quotes once again St. Augustine (28).

The soul was created for happiness, indeed the highest happiness. This no one will deny, for all men seek happiness and we all know how miserable men are when they lose temporal goods. One could not be happy if he lived in fear and dread of losing this good or even if he lived in uncertainty of possessing it always. Hence the soul cannot be truly said to be happy unless it reached that definite state in which it will no longer have any fear or possibility of subsequent loss. This permanence demands that the soul be immortal.

(28) «Licet autem in cognitionem immortalitatis animae rationalis multiplici via possemus deduci et manduci, potissimus tamen modus deveniendi in eius cognitionem est ex consideratione finis; et hunc modum praecipue approbat Augustinus in XIII *De Trinitate* (cap. 7 sq., n. 10 sq., PL 42, 1020 sq.) et in libro *De Civitate Dei* (Lib. VIII, c. 8; XIV, c. 25; XIX, c. 1 sq., PL 41, 232 sq., 433, 621 sq.). Nec immerito, quia finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem» (*In II Sent.*, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, p. 460).

for it is the end that imposes its necessity upon the means, and in so stating this principle the Seraphic Doctor enunciates a profound metaphysical teaching which governs the very order of the universe and the intelligibility of human life. This desire for happiness St. Bonaventure places as the groundwork for all his mysticism and as a consequence of all his philosophy and for him this happiness must consist in the possession of the most perfect good. This, then, is our Saint's teaching on the soul and now we pass to a discussion of the cognitive and affective powers of this immortal soul which will lead us to understand clearly St. Bonaventure's notion of reason and its various divisions (29).

Man, as has been stated, is composed of body and soul. His activities are manifold, for not only does he exist, but he lives, senses and rationalizes. To gain his knowledge he must use the faculties of both these constituent principles.

The Soul and Its Faculties.

The soul is the principle of life in man and through it man operates. It displays manifold powers and so is responsible for man's vegetative, sensitive, and cognitive acts. Through its vegetative power the soul generates, nourishes, and grows; through its sensitive power it apprehends the sensible, retains that which has been apprehended, combines and divides what has been retained. It retains through memory, combines and divides through the phantasy which is the first «collative» power. Through its intellective powers the soul discerns the truth, avoids evil, and seeks the good. The discernment of truth is cognition and this belongs to the intellect. The appetition of the good and flight from what is difficult belong to the affective or volitive power in man, namely, the will (30). Thus

(29) Cf. E. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, pp. 335-338.

(30) «Et ideo non tantum (*anima*) unitur corpori ut perfectio, verum etiam ut motor; et sic perficit per essentiam, quod movet pariter per potentiam. Et quoniam ipsa non tantum dat *esse*, verum etiam *vivere* et *sentire* et *intelligere*; ideo potentiam habet vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam, ita quod per potentiam vegetativam generat, nutrit et augmentat: generat ut *qui*, nutrit ut *quale*, augmentat ut *quantum*. Per sensitivam apprehendit sensibilia, retinet apprehensa, componit et divi-

St. Bonaventure speaks of but three specifically distinct powers of the soul, namely, vegetive, sensitive, and rational and this latter is subdivided into cognitive and affective or intellect and will. Here it must be stated clearly that although the Seraphic Doctor uses various terms to designate the cognitive and affective powers of man, he admits but two faculties in the rational soul, namely intellect and will. If at times he calls the intellect, *ratio*, or if the *ratio* be divided into *superior* or *inferior*, or the intellect be called the speculative or practical, or the possible or active intellect, it is the same faculty, namely, the intellect, which is operating. It is called by different names either because of the various ways in which the intellect may operate or because of the various objects which may specify this potency. All these terms are simply various differences, outlooks, functions, or offices of the rational soul using its cognitive activity (31). It will be our endeavor to explain these various terms but first in order to understand the Seraphic Doctor's teaching more clearly it must be stated that he admits no real distinction between the soul and its faculties and as a consequence the first problem or question to be solved deals with the exact relation that unites the soul with its faculties.

The question of knowledge in the philosophy of St. Bonaventure is not one which concerns one faculty but which concerns the soul with its two principal faculties of intellect and will. Thus it is the soul which rises and falls; it is the soul of man which rehabilitates or degrades its power to know in the same proportion as it strengthens or weakens its power to love. It is the soul which thinks, the soul which loves, and it is the soul which looks at things which are either above or

dit retenta: apprehendit quidem per sensitivam exteriorem quinque partitam secundum correspondentiam ad quinque mundi corpora principalia; retinet per memoriam, componit et dividit per phantasiam, quae est prima virtus collativa. Per intellectivam autem discernit verum, refugit malum et appetit bonum: verum quidem discernit per rationalem, malum repellit per irascibilem, bonum appetit per concupiscibilem » (*Breviloquium*, II, 9, p. 227). For an interesting and historical study of the relation of the soul to its faculties see the excellent work of P. KÜNZLE, *Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen*, Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1956.

(31) *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl., p. 566.

below itself (32). This does not mean that the soul is immediately operative, for there is only one self-operative principle, namely, God. Although St. Bonaventure does not admit a real distinction between the soul and its faculties, he states that the soul operates through its faculties. He accepts a mediate view which says that the faculties of the soul are not its essential and intrinsic principles, yet neither are they so diverse as to be classified as accidents. The faculties of the soul belong to the same genus as does the soul, namely substance, but *per reductionem*. They are consubstantial with the soul (33). The term «to reduce» for St. Bonaventure means «to indicate the class of substance in which a being is grouped which is not itself a substance» (34). What, then, is the precise meaning when we say that the intellect and the will belong to the same genus as does the soul *per reductionem*?

Intellect and will are not to be identified with the soul to the extent that they are its essential and intrinsic principles; neither, however, are they so different from the soul that they may be classified into another genus as simple accidents. In a strict sense the faculties of the soul enjoy no other essence than the substance of the soul itself; they cannot differ from the soul nor from one another as different es-

(32) Cf. E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

(33) «Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia, ut per haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto, intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima — potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis — non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem» (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, p. 86).

(34) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 345. *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ad 8, St. Bonaventure gives his definition of the term «to reduce» and gives the five classes of reduction. «Sunt enim quaedam quae sunt in genere per se, aliqua per reductionem. Illa per se sunt in genere quae participant essentiam completam illius generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per reductionem, quae non dicunt completam essentiam, et haec sub quinque membris continentur. Quedam reducuntur sicut principia, quaedam sicut complementa, quaedam sicut viae, quaedam sicut similitudines, quaedam sicut privationes».

sences. Again, we cannot say that they are wholly identical with the soul or with one another. The soul has need of them as the different occasions arise, as one would have need of various and diverse instruments for the performance of different tasks. Thus they are sufficiently distinct from one another and do not constitute a single faculty; yet, neither are they different essences. «They are», as St. Bonaventure states, «distinct as faculties, but one as different faculties of the same substance, and in consequence, although they are not substance, all that is positive in their being must be reduced or referred to the class of substance » (35).

Although in the *Second Book of the Sentences*, distinction twenty-four, part one, article two, question one, St. Bonaventure raises the question whether the intellect and will essentially differ and in the answer to this question he states that it is more a question of curiosity than of utility, because whatever view one holds no harm is brought either to faith or morals, nevertheless, we think this a point of sufficient interest to compare this teaching of the Seraphic Doctor with that of St. Thomas. From the outset it may be said that from a theological standpoint both agree in stating that the soul is not its faculties in the same way as we would say that God is His attributes. Further, they would both deny that the soul may be separated from its faculties. St. Bonaventure, however, would not attribute to the faculties of the soul the term «accident» in the same way as this term is used by St. Thomas to show the relation between the soul and its faculties. We may likewise say that the Angelic Doctor also recognizes that the faculties of the soul are accidents of a special sort, for although it may be possible to consider that a substance could exist without its accidents, yet in regard to the soul it is hardly conceivable that such an essence could exist for a single instance without its intellect and will. In order to solve this difficulty, St. Thomas offers a new distinction. A faculty may be called an accident in so far as an accident stands in opposition to substance, but in so far as an accident is opposed to the predicaments, namely, genus, species, the

(35) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

individual, the proper, and the difference, it comes under the heading of the proper. Thus from the Thomistic view-point the faculties are accidents, yet accidents of a special sort, namely, they are properties really distinct from their subject and yet practically inseparable from them. Thus the faculties of the soul stand as intermediaries between substance and accident (36). Again, we might add that according to the Thomistic teaching if abstraction is made of the soul's accidents, it cannot remember, know, or love itself. St. Bonaventure would say that the soul in this case can do so. This point would show a great difference between Christian Aristotelianism and the Augustinian doctrine as explained by St. Bonaventure, for in the former teaching the soul does not contain in itself when separated from its accidents the sufficient conditions for its acts, while in the latter doctrine the soul is sufficient to explain and to produce them. The Seraphic Doctor does not make use of the metaphysical distinction which would state that the soul, the least of the intelligible forms, does not have its operations and their content from itself. For him the soul, moving at once from its substance to the acts which spring from it, supplies itself with the intelligible and the good and at the same time with the two faculties of intellect and will in order to know the one and to love the other (37). This point will be met once again, when we discuss the origin of our first principles according to the teaching of St. Bonaventure. But to return to our original point is to see just precisely what our Saint means by the terms « reason ».

Reason and Intellect.

Man's cognitive operations may be divided into sensitive and intellective. The intellectual faculty, according to the Seraphic Doctor, may be considered as twofold, namely, reason

(36) « Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales » (*Sum. Theol.*, I, 77, 1, ad. 5). See also *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, q. un., a. 2, ad Resp.; *I Sent.*, 3, 4, 2, ad 1; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 77, 1, ad 1; *Quodlib.*, X, 3, 5, ad Resp. Cf. E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-334.

(37) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

and intellect. Here, again, we must remember that it is but one faculty, the intellect. St. Bonaventure gives this twofold denomination of man's intellectual operation and explains each. «The intellectual potency is twofold: partly as it considers universal abstract reasons, as it abstracts from place, time, and dimensions; partly as it is elevated to separated spiritual substances; and so there are two potencies, namely reason and intellect» (38). It is the function of reason to consider universal ideas, to abstract from the realm of phenomena and sense, and to break the limitations set by place, time, and space. The intellect is ordained to contemplate separated spiritual substances. In doing so, it comes to a knowledge of itself. Through reason the soul complies, gathers, and collects (*confert*), but through the intellect it knows itself and spiritual substances. Hence it contemplates itself and spiritual substances and is thus able to enter into the eternity which they enjoy (39). This, then, shows the difference between the intellect and reason. It would seem that the term «reason» is used more with regard to discursive knowledge, while the term «intellect» is employed for self-reflection and contemplation. Yet in regard to the acquisition of knowledge, especially with respect to the process of abstraction, St. Bonaventure employs the terms «possible and active intellect». Here there would seem to be an overlapping. If it is the duty of reason to compile, gather, and collect, then this term should be employed in place of the possible or active intellect. Yet there is no difficulty, if it is kept in mind that whether St. Bonaventure calls man's intellectual operation, reason or intellect, he means two different functions of the same faculty rather than two different faculties. Here we might introduce briefly the Seraphic Doctor's teaching concerning the possible and active intellect, a doctrine which will be most useful when we treat of the relation between reason and senses.

(38) «Intellectualis etiam est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes abstractas ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separatas; et sic sunt duae potentiae, scilicet ratio et intellectus» (*In Hexaemeron*, V, p. 358).

(39) «Per rationem confert, per intellectum cognoscit se et substantias spirituales; et tunc ingerit se Intelligentiis, et tunc intrat aeviternum ipsarum» (*Ibid.*, p. 358).

It is the teaching of St. Bonaventure that all men have an active and possible intellect. God has given to the human soul not only a possible but also an active intellect. Each belongs to the soul itself (40). The Seraphic Doctor is a staunch opponent of the averroistic doctrine which states that in man there are three intellects, the active, potential, and possible intellect. Of these the active and potential intellect were immortal and the same for all men, while the possible intellect, a cognitive faculty, was sensitive and mortal. Such a doctrine cannot be held without destroying the distinction and individuation which belongs to each soul (41). The active and possible intellect are two differences of the same intellectual potency which concur inseparably in one complete operation of knowing. The possible intellect is not entirely passive; neither is the active intellect completely active (42). In the teaching of St. Bonaventure, the possible intellect turns toward the intelligible contained in the sensible species and abstracts and judges this intelligible in virtue of the power that the active intellect gives it. The important point to be noted here is the inability of both intellects to exercise their function without the co-operation of the other. They are interdependent, each intellect participating in the activity of the other. They may be termed «two reciprocal movements in conjunction with a single operation» (43). There is another salient feature of this teaching. It is that if two functions of the intellect concur so intimately in one operation, then they cannot be

(40) «Sic credendum est indubitanter quod animae humanae non tantummodo (Deus) dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est aliquid ipsius animae» (*In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, p. 568). See also *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, VIII, 19, V, p. 498.

(41) *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, Coll. IX, pp. 498-503. See also C. O'DONNELL, *The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, C.U. Press, 1931), p. 63.

(42) For the teaching of St. Thomas on this point see *De Veritate*, q. 15, a. 2, corp.: «Sic etiam circa intellectum agens et possibilis intellectus distinguuntur. Non enim eadem ratione est obiectum aliquid in quantum est in actu et in quantum est in potentia, aut in quantum agit et patitur: intelligibile enim actu, est obiectum intellectus possibilis agens quasi in ipsum, prout eo exit de potentia in actum; intelligibile vero in potentia est obiectum intellectus agentis, prout fit per intellectum agentem intelligibile actu».

(43) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

really distinct. Hence they are two phases or aspects of the same faculty: they are «two simple differences of function within a single substance and two correlative aspects of the same operation» (44). To return then to the faculty of «reason» is to see the various ways in which St. Bonaventure uses the term «reason».

St. Bonaventure states that truth is the object of man's cognition and that knowledge of truth is twofold: truth as truth, or truth as good. This truth can be eternal, which entirely exceeds the soul, or temporal, which is below the soul. Whence it follows that the cognitive power in man, namely the intellect and reason, is also subject to a double classification, the intellect into the speculative and the practical and the reason into the superior and the inferior parts. Here then we meet the terms *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior* and we must study their various meanings (45).

The Various Uses of the Term «Reason».

The superior reason and the inferior reason are to be considered as various functions of the one intellect according as it turns to objects of greater or less intelligibility. The difference between the two is not one of nature but one obtained from a diverse comparison of the same faculty. When reason turns to what is above itself, it is cleansed, illumined, and perfected; when it contemplates the eternal laws and the immutability

(44) *Ibid.*, p. 370; *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, p. 569: «Nec intellectus possibilis est pure passivus: habet enim supra speciem existentem in phantasmate se convertere et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam suscipere et de ea judicare. Similiter nec intellectus agens est omnino in actu: non enim potest intelligere aliud a se nisi adiuvetur a specie, quae abstracta a phantasmate intellectui habet uniri. Unde nec possibilis intelligit sine agente nec agens sine possibili».

(45) *Breviloquium*, pars II, IX, 7, p. 227: «Amplius quoniam cognitio veri est duplex: vel veri ut *veri*, vel veri ut *boni*; et hoc vel aeterni, quod est supra animam, vel temporalis, quod est infra: hinc est, quod potentia cognitiva, utpote intellectus et ratio, dividitur ita, quod intellectus in speculativum et practicum, ratio in superiorem portionem et inferiorem; quae potius nominat diversa officia quam diversas potentias». See also *II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 sq. and the *Collat. in Hexaemeron.*, coll. 4, No. 1 seq. and coll. 5, No. 23 seq.

of divine virtue it is strengthened in good; its very activity suggests that it should be called *ratio superior*. However, when reason turns to what is below itself, to the sensible and to the carnal, in a certain sense it is drawn toward it and weakened. It becomes inferior in turning to what is beneath its dignity and receives the name *ratio inferior*. Thus superior reason and inferior reason are of the same nature, differing only according to the disposition of strength and of weakness. Superior reason in knowing and seeking the divine will is strong; inferior reason in pursuing its object is weakened. Thus the one (*ratio superior*) rules, while the other is ruled. St. Bonaventure uses a simile borrowed from St. Augustine and calls the *ratio superior*, the man, because it rules, and the *ratio inferior*, the woman, because it is ruled (46). Thus the entire difference is one of duty and of rule.

Superior reason is capable of finding in all things their higher and divine content. In doing so it is able to rule over the inferior reason. Inferior reason is concerned with things outside and inferior to itself. It is not capable of arriving at a fully understood judgment concerning moral conduct; it is not sufficient to formulate universal knowledge and principles. Superior reason, however, is able to see beyond the veil of contingency. It is intimately connected with eternal rules and in the light of these judges and defines with certainty. Inferior reason would be lost in the apprehension of created objects, if it were not for this superior disposition. Man's soul is precisely called an image of God because of this superior reason (47). Thus superior reason has an ethical and a religious value. By means of this office the rational soul finds in all things their higher content and reaches divine wisdom in

(46) « Est enim differentia in eis secundum dispositiones et secundum officia. Secundum dispositiones, quia haec fortis et illa debilis; secundum officia, quia haec regit et illa regitur. Ratione diversae dispositionis in debilitate et fortitudine haec vocatur vir et illa mulier; ratione diversitatis in officio et regimine haec vocatur superior, quia regit, et illa inferior, quia regitur » (*In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, p. 564). See ST. AUGUSTINE, *De Trinitate*, XII, cap. 3, No. 3 et c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 999, 1007 sq.).

(47) Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, p. 564.

contemplating the eternal ideas. This, then, is St. Bonaventure's notion of the superior and the inferior reason, two different functions of the one rational faculty, namely, the intellect.

The Relation of Reason to the Senses.

It has been rightfully stated that no where else in the realm of metaphysics do we find the doctrine of St. Bonaventure so fully and deliberately elaborated as in the theory of knowledge which he proposes. However, it must always be kept in mind that the doctrine which he proposes cannot be separated from the rest of his teaching to which it belongs. Thus the first point to be resolved in St. Bonaventure's treatment of human knowledge concerns the precise and correct relation that exists between the soul and its faculties (48). This we have seen in the preceding pages and the next problem to be solved concerns the relation of reason to the senses. How does reason use them in performing its intellectual operations?

Man has five exterior senses through which he comes into contact with the outside world. St. Bonaventure states that these five exterior senses correspond to the fivefold makeup of the universe (49). All these five senses unite in one interior sense, called *sensus communis* which co-ordinates the sense-perceptions and distinguishes them (50). Man also has sense-memory and imagination. In the sense-memory is restored the various sense perceptions obtained from the exterior senses and common sense. It is the work of the imagination to consider these sense impressions and to store them in the

(48) Cf. E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-341.

(49) « Homo igitur, qui dicitur minor mundus, habet quinque sensus quasi quinque portas, per quas intrat cognitio omnium, quae sunt in mundo sensibili, in animam ipsius. Nam per visum intrant corpora sublimia et luminosa et cetera colorata, per tactum vero corpora solida et terrestria, per tres vero sensus intermedios intrant intermedia, ut per gustum aquea, per auditum aerea, per odoratum vaporabilia, quae aliquid habent de natura humida, aliquid de aerea, aliquid de ignea seu calida, sicut patet in fumo ex aromatibus resolutio » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, c. II, 3, p. 300). See also *De Reductione Artium*, No. 3, V, p. 320.

(50) Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 7, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 ad 2, pp. 190-191.

memory (51). Hence our knowledge of corporeal things begins with the senses as from the exterior and is not perfected until it comes to the intellect which truly recognises that it is a thing. How do these sense images reach the intellect? (Here the terms intellect and reason are taken as the same faculty). Since the possible intellect is partly active, it co-operates with the active intellect in order to separate the intelligible species from the phantasm (52). This act of separation requires a judgment which St. Bonaventure calls a *dijudicatio*. Dijudication is, therefore, the act which causes the sensible species, sensibly accepted through the senses to enter the intellective faculty by means of purification and abstraction (53). This

(51) « Quia vero imaginaria est earum rerum, quarum imagines in interiori sensu exprimuntur... » (*In I Sent.*, d. 16, art. un., q. 2 ad 4, p. 282). « Ad illud quod obicitur, quod memoria est sensibilibus, dicendum quod memoria accipitur tripliciter: uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilibus et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum sive sensibilibus sive intelligibilibus; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum » (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 ad 3, p. 81). Cf. in *IV Sent.*, d. 10, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, f. 2, IV, p. 234: « Ex multis sensibus fit una memoria ». In regard to the *Vis Aestimativa*. St. Bonaventure makes reference to it in *Hexaameron*, 2, No. 29, V, p. 341. See B. A. LUYCHX, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, Münster, 1923: « Er nennt sie auch einmal mit ihrem eigenen Namen in *Hexaameron* (coll. 2, No. 29, B. 5, S. 341). « Er spricht auch ausdrücklich über dieses Verfahren und nennt es eine dijudicatio, eine Art urteil über die Nützlichkeit oder Schädlichkeit eines Dingen. Das einzige, was er noch binzufügt, ist: "Dieses gehört zu der innern Potenz". Unseres Wissens spricht er sich nicht weiter über die aestimativa aus ».

(52) *In II Sent.*, d. 24, a. 2, q. 4, p. 571.

(53) « Post hanc apprehensionem et oblectationem fit dijudicatio, qua non solum dijudicatur, utrum hoc sit album, vel nigrum, quia hoc pertinet ad sensum particularem; non, solum, utrum sit salubre, vel nocivum, quia hoc pertinet ad sensum interiorem; verum etiam, quia dijudicatur et ratio redditur, quare hoc delectat; et in hoc actu inquiritur de ratione delectationis, quae in sensu percipitur ab obiecto... Dijudicatio igitur est actio, quae speciem sensibilem, sensibiliter per sensus acceptam, introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectivam » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, c. II, 7, p. 301).

« La famosa *dijudicatio*, che dà sia la specie sensibile sia la specie intelligibile, non è che la semplice apprensione: bianco, nero, freddo, caldo, pietra, cane, uomo. Essa è il frutto di un *ricevere* e di un *agire* dell'anima su se stessa per determinarsi, nel senso o nell'intelletto, secondo il *ricevere*, cioè secondo l'attività dell'oggetto: "In omni potentia cognitiva necesse est reperire agentem et passibilem" (*In IV Sent.*,

judgment treats of an immutable and universal object. Since our minds cannot grasp by themselves what is universal and immutable, there is needed the guidance of the eternal reasons. These are the exemplars, the patterns, according to which all things were created. Essentially they are the same as God (54). They act as the movers and regulators of our thought (55). In order to understand this process of abstraction, of intellection properly, we must explain, at least in part, St. Bonaventure's theory of illumination.

The Seraphic Doctor speaks of *cognitio certitudinaliter* and of the *rationes aeternae*. *Cognitio certitudinaliter* is that knowledge which possesses the highest certitude. The *rationes aeternae*, as has been stated, are the patterns according to which things were created. Now we have many judgements which possess this *cognitio certitudinaliter*, as for example, the judgment that two and two are four. Yet this certain cognition cannot exist unless there be perfect conformity between the knower and the thing known. Hence there must be an infallibility on the side of the knower and immutability with respect to the thing known. As is evident, all objects of

d. 50, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, f. 4; IV, 1045 a). La corrispondenza dell'agire e del ricevere dalla conoscenza *oggettiva*; mentre l'intelletto agente e l'intelletto passivo o possibile non sono che un solo intelletto, detto *agente* in quanto reagisce davanti alla specie sensibile per formare in se stesso la specie intelligibile corrispondente, e *passivo* in quanto viene determinato e riceve così la specie nell'atto stesso dell'autodeterminazione dell'anima intellettuale davanti all'oggetto. La specie stessa non è che l'intelletto, prima in potenza ad ogni idea, attuato poi dall'autodeterminazione secondo un'idea particolare corrispondente ad un oggetto particolare» (L. VEUTHEY, *Bonaventura* (s.), in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, p. 749).

(54) « Si enim diiudicatio habet fieri per rationem abstrahentem a loco, tempore et mutabilitate ac per hoc a dimensione successione et transmutatione, per rationem immutabilem et incircumscripibilem et interminabilem; nihil autem est omnino immutabile, incircumscripibile et interminabile, nisi quod est aeternum; omne autem quod est aeternum, est Deus, vel in Deo; si ergo omnia, quaecumque certius diiudicamus, per huiusmodi rationem diiudicamus; patet, quod ipse est ratio omnium rerum et regula infallibilis et lux veritatis, in qua cuncta relucent infallibiliter, indelebiliter, indubitanter, irrefragabiliter, indiiudicabiliter, incommutabiliter, incoarctabiliter, interminabiliter, indivisibiliter et intellectualiter » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, II, 9, p. 301). See also *De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, 23, p. 19.

(55) In *I Sent.*, d. 17, p. 1, art. un., q. 4, pp. 300-302.

sense are mutable and contingent and finite intelligence is prone to error. Hence are these conditions of immutability and infallibility possible of fulfillment? St. Bonaventure says yes, for these qualities can be obtained through the intervention of God who alone is immutable and eternal. In order to obtain this certitude the object must be immutable. The Seraphic Doctor says that things are capable of existing in three ways, in the mind, in their own proper genus, and in the eternal reason. As things exist in themselves and in the mind, they are mutable; immutability is to be obtained only in so far as things exist in the eternal reasons (56). Thus for this *cognitio certitudinalis* the mind must in some way come in contact with the eternal reasons. For St. Bonaventure this constitutes divine illumination.

To say that the eternal reasons are the sole object of our knowledge is to make the statement that here on earth we enjoy the same knowledge as the Blessed in heaven. This would be equal to ontologism or intuitionism, doctrines incompatible with the teachings of the Church. Ontologism following the tenets of innate ideas states that all intellectual ideas and principles are innate in man, as Leibnitz maintained, or at least, that the universal and absolute ideas- and under this heading comes our idea of God- are present in man before any experimental knowledge. Thus, according to this teaching, man knows God directly or immediately and from such a cognition all other knowledge depends and has its origin.

(56) « Nobilitas, inquam, cognitionis, quia cognitio certitudinalis esse non potest, nisi sit ex parte scibilis immutabilitas, et infallibilitas ex parte scientis. Veritas autem creata non est immutabilis simpliciter, sed ex suppositione; similiter nec lux creaturae est omnino infallibilis ex propria virtute, cum utraque sit creata et prodierit de non esse in esse. Si ergo ad plenam cognitionem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem omnino infallibilem; necesse est, quod in huiusmodi cognitionem recurratur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam, dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem scibili. Unde cum res habeant esse in mente et in proprio genere et in aeterna arte, non sufficit ipsi animae ad certitudinalem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, vel secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utrobique sunt mutabiles, nisi aliquo modo attingat eas, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna » (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, p. 23).

This in brief is the fundamental teaching of the ontologists, even though Malebranche, Ubaghs, Gioberti, Rosmini, Brownson seek to explain or embellish this doctrine in their own way (57). In his system of thought, St. Bonaventure does not favor the doctrine of the ontologists and it is only by completely misunderstanding his thought that any ontologicistic interpretation can be placed upon it. Hence the Seraphic Doctor rejects this doctrine as the way in which we are in contact with the eternal reasons. Another way is that the eternal reasons only influence the knower. This likewise is rejected by the Seraphic Doctor. First, it is not in accord with the teaching of St. Augustine. Secondly, it asserts that this influence of God is either general or special. It cannot be general because God influences our minds more than He concurs with the other earthly creatures. It cannot be a special influence for the reason that such a manner of influence would destroy acquired knowledge. After rejecting these theories, he shows that there is another way in which the mind can come in contact with the eternal reasons. It is precisely because the eternal reasons act as the movers and regulators of our thought (58).

(57) The following statements were proclaimed as *tuto tradi non possunt* by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, Sept. 18, 1861: «Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit: siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale» (DENZINGER-BANNWART, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, No. 1659). «Esse illud, quod in omnibus et sine quo nihil intelligimus, est esse divinum» (DB, No. 1660). «Universalis a parte rei considerata a Deo realiter non distinguuntur» (DB, No. 1661). «Omnes aliae ideae non sunt nisi modificationes ideae, qua Deus tanquam ens simpliciter intelligitur» (DB, No. 1663). For the condemnation of the errors of Rosmini see Denzinger-Bannwart, No. 1891-1930 a. See also T.M. ZIGLIARA, *Della luce intellettuale e dell'ontologismo* (Roma, Tipografia Cattolica di F. Chiapperini e C., 1874), vol. II, chapter XI, «L'ontologismo e la Congregazione del Sant'Uffizio», pp. 148-164.

(58) «Praeterea illa lucis influentia aut est generalis, quantum Deus influit in omnibus creaturis, aut est specialis, sicut Deus influit per gratiam. Si est generalis: ergo Deus non magis debet dici dator sapientiae quam fecundator terrae, nec magis ab eo diceretur esse scientia quam pecunia; si specialis, cuiusmodi est in gratia: ergo secundum hoc omnis cognitio est infusa, et nulla est acquisita, vel innata; quae omnia sunt absurda. Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilicet quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario

The eternal reasons act as a rule. As such they restrict our thoughts into definite limitations. Thus we cannot think of a square circle. When I come to the knowledge of a circle, I know the essence of this circle to be contingent and mutable. Yet the ideal circle existing in the mind of God is eternal and immutable. Hence I cannot think of a square circle because this idea existing in the mind of God so regulates my thought that I cannot think of a circle as being compatible with a square. In such a way the eternal reasons give to my knowledge immutability and necessity.

The eternal reasons also move our minds to a cognition of first principles, truths so fundamental that all our knowledge depends upon them and without which we could never obtain certitude. Thus we attain the knowledge of first principles through the moving force of the eternal reasons. Let us take an example. The idea of being is primary in our intellect. Through the negation of this being we form the idea of non-being. This idea of being which we have is primarily that of an absolute and immutable being. It must be such, for we can only reach the mutable and imperfect after we have obtained the perfect and immutable. «Being, therefore, is that which first comes to the intellect and that being is that which is pure act» (59). Since, therefore, this idea is first and possesses these qualities which belong to God alone, I must form this idea of being by the eternal reasons.

We return to the process of abstracting the intelligible from the sensible. The possible intellect, which itself is partly active, co-operates with the active intellect in separating the intelligible species from the phantasm. For this process there is required a judgment concerning the object which is uni-

requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contrita secundum statum viae» (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, p. 23).

(59) «Cum autem *non-esse* privatio sit essendi, non cadit in intellectum nisi per *esse*; *esse* autem non cadit per aliud, quia omnes, quod intelligitur aut intelligitur *non ens*, aut ut *ens in potentia*, aut ut *ens in actu*. Si igitur *non-ens* non potest intelligi nisi per *ens*, et *ens in potentia* non nisi per *ens in actu*; et *esse* nominat ipsum purum actum entis: esse igitur est quod primo cadit in intellectu, et illud *esse* est quod est purus actus» (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, c. V, 3, p. 308).

versal and immutable in the phantasm. Hence there is need of divine aid and it is precisely because man is related to God as an image that this aid is given and that the eternal reasons are able to act as regulators and movers of man's thought (60). This process will become clearer when we treat of the way in which human reason knows God. Here it suffices to say that for the apprehension of the intelligible from sense knowledge there is required divine assistance, divine illumination. Thus the senses are necessary for our cognition of corporeal things. This St. Bonaventure, being the true scholastic that he was, readily admits, yet the Seraphic Doctor taught that we have other knowledge than that derived from sensation.

In the *Second Book of Sentences*, the reader meets a striking passage, for here it is stated by St. Bonaventure that all cognition does not begin with the senses. He holds that the soul knows God and itself plus what is in itself without any admixture of the exterior senses. To the statement of Aristotle that all cognition begins with the senses, St. Bonaventure replies that this statement must be understood of those things which have their being in the soul through an abstract similitude. When the Stagirite states that the soul is a *tabula rasa*, that nothing has been written on the soul, he does not mean that there is no knowledge in the soul but that there is no picture nor abstract similitude in the soul (61).

(60) Cf. *De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, p. 23 sq.

(61) « Ex his patet responsio ad illam quaestionem, qua quaeritur, utrum omnis cognitio sit a sensu. Dicendum est quod non. Necessario enim oportet ponere quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde, si aliquando dicat Philosophus (ARISTOTLE, *De sensu et sens.*, c. 6, III, 488), quod nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu et quod omnis cognitio habet ortum a sensu, intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitudinem abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus (*De anima*, III, c. 4, II, 468), quod in anima nihil scriptum est, non quia nulla sit in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea pictura vel similitudo abstracta. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro *De civitate Dei* (cf. Lib. XI, c. 27, No. 2, *PL* 41, 341): « Inseruit nobis Deus naturale iudicarium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid tenebrarum, cognoscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa » (in *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, p. 904). See also *De Donis*

This, then, suffices to show the relation of reason to the senses and we now pass to a discussion of human reason and its relation to God.

Spiritus Sancti, VIII, 13, T. V, p. 496: « Anima autem nostra habet supra se quoddam lumen naturae signatum, per quod habilis est ad cognoscenda prima principia, sed illud solum non sufficit, quia, secundum Philosophum: " principium scientiae esse quoddam dicimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus " (*I Poster.*, c. 3). Quando enim scio, quid totum, quid pars; statim scio, quod " omne totum maius est sua parte " ».

CHAPTER III

HUMAN REASON AND ITS RELATION TO GOD

In the preceding chapter we have seen that even for our knowledge acquired through the medium of the senses there is required a contact with the eternal reasons. It has also been stated that the soul is able to abstract the intelligible species from the sense object and this it does by means of the natural light, the *naturale iudicatorium*, which is innate in the soul and which is in contact with the eternal reasons (1). Yet, according to the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, we have knowledge of other things, the origin of which does not depend upon man's senses. This St. Bonaventure declares when he writes that all our knowledge does not begin from the senses, for the soul knows God and itself and all those things which are in the soul without any admixture of the external senses (2). How then is this possible?

St. Bonaventure asserts that the rational soul has memory, intelligence, and will. Intelligence and will are distinct faculties but memory is not a separate potency from intelligence. Both constitute the one intellect, for memory and intelligence are concerned with the same object; memory preserves and presents it to the intellect and the latter confides it to the memory after it has first performed the operation of acquiring and judging it (3). Memory, since it is concerned with hap-

(1) In *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, p. 903.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 903.

(3) « Ad propositam quaestionem respondendum est quod intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, non sunt una potentia, sed diversae... Unde intuenti usum potentiarum manifesto iudicio apparebit quod maior est differentia intelligentiae ad voluntatem quam sit intelligentiae ad memoriam vel etiam irascibilis ad concupiscibilem. Memoria enim et

penings of the present, past, and even future, is in a certain sense an image of the eternity of God. For as God by means of His absolute presence, which we call eternity, embraces all times in one moment, so the soul by means of its memory joins the past and the future in the present moment which so quickly passes away (4). The duty of intelligence is to understand terms, propositions, and syllogisms and it is in so doing that the intellect helped by the divine light arrives at the highest concepts of «being», «goodness», etc. (5). The function of the will is to advise, judge and desire. In advising the will always seeks that which is better; yet it would not know the better unless it also knew the best. Hence this elective power is in contact in some way with the divine (6). In judging about advisable things, one does so by rules and laws which are above the mind and it is in conformity with Augustinian tradition that nothing is above the mind except God (7). The same is true in regard to the desire of the will

intelligentia negotiantur circa idem, ita quod ista acquirit et illa conservat vel illa offert et ista diiudicat. Similiter concupiscibilis et irascibilis ita se habent quod concupiscibilis acquirit et irascibilis defendit; et quia utrumque horum necessarium est ad perfectionem actus cognitionis et affectionis, ideo memoria et intelligentia potius dicuntur diversae vires quam diversae potentiae, similiter irascibilis et concupiscibilis » (in *II Sent.*, d. 24, pars 1, a. 2, q. 1, p. 560). See also E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

(4) « Ex prima igitur retentione actuali omnium temporalium, praeteritorum scilicet, praesentium et futurorum, habet effigiem aeternitatis, cuius praesens indivisibile ad omnia tempora se extendit » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 2, p. 303). See also *De Mystério Trinitatis*, q. 5, a. 1, T. V, p. 90: « In anima namque est Dei imago, est memoria praeteritorum, intelligentia praesentium et praeventia futurorum, et haec quidem simul sunt in anima, ita quod in anima, quae est substantia spiritualis, simul colliguntur et coniunguntur quae per diversa tempora succedunt; quia tamen ipsa limitata est et aliquid accipit a re extra, deficit ab illa similitudine perfecta. Deus autem nihil prorsus accipit nec aliquo modo habet limitari; et ideo omnia sibi ut praesentia necessarium est intelligi, et hoc sine principio et fine; et hoc est intelligere aeternitatem ».

(5) « Operatio autem virtutis intellectivae est in perceptione intellectus terminorum, propositionum et illationum » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 3, p. 304).

(6) « Omni igitur consilianti necessario est impressa notio summi boni » (*ibid.*, III, 4, p. 305).

(7) « Nihil autem est superior mente humana, nisi solus ille qui fecit eam » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, 3, p. 305).

which seeks either the supreme good or that which has the likeness of the supreme good (8). Thus the soul reaches God through memory, intelligence, and will which are the image of God and which make the soul capable of God *capax Dei*. It is here in the third chapter of the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* that the reader finds the beautiful words of the Seraphic Doctor: «See, therefore, in what manner how the soul is close to God and how memory leads to eternity, intelligence to truth, and the elective power to the highest good according to their operations» (9). Thus in their operation and relation these three powers reflect the life of the most Blessed Trinity itself. These three powers, the mind and its cognition and the uniting love of itself, possess the same substance, are equal, penetrate each other, and so have for their model the Blessed Trinity, where is to be found not one substance in three powers but one substance in three persons (10). The sciences also bear the mark and the seal of the Blessed trinity. In these sciences are also to be found infallible rules which having their origin in the eternal laws also enlighten our minds (11). Thus it is the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor that we know God by

(8) «Nihil igitur appetit humanum desiderium nisi quia summum bonum, vel quia est ad illud, vel quia habet aliquam effigiem illius» (*ibid.*, p. 305).

(9) «Vide igitur, quomodo anima Deo propinqua, et quomodo memoria in aeternitatem, intelligentia in veritatem, electiva potentia ducit in bonitatem summam secundum operationes suas» (*ibid.*, p. 305).

(10) «Secundum autem harum potentiarum ordinem et originem et habitudinem ducit in ipsam beatissimam Trinitatem. Nam ex memoria oritur intelligentia ut ipsius proles, quia tunc intelligimus, cum similitudo, quae est in memoria, resultat in acie intellectus, quae nihil aliud est quam verbum; ex memoria et intelligentia spiratur amor tamquam nexus amborum. Haec tria scilicet mens generans, verbum et amor, sunt in anima quoad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae sunt consubstantiales, coaequales et coevae, se invicem circumincedentes. Si igitur Deus perfectus est spiritus, habet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, habet et Verbum genitum et Amorem spiratum, qui necessario distinguuntur, cum unus ab altero producat, non essentialiter, non accidentaliter, ergo personaliter» (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 5, p. 305).

(11) «Omnes autem hae scientiae habent regulas certas et infallibiles tanquam lumina et radios descendentes a lege aeterna in mentem nostram. Et ideo mens nostra tantis splendoribus irradiata et superfusa, nisi sit caeca, manuduci potest per semetipsam ad contemplandam illam lucem aeternam» (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 7, p. 305).

something innate in our soul. Moreover, we know the soul and what is in the soul by themselves. According to the important text of St. Bonaventure already previously stated (12), namely, that not all knowledge begins with the senses, we may say that it is his doctrine that man has an immediate knowledge of himself, that man is able to know himself, his soul and what is in his soul by direct experience (13). For this self-knowledge, it suffices that the soul be a soul, that is, that it be a spiritual substance, present to and united with itself and this is enough for the soul to possess the power to remember, to know, and to love itself. This is the reason also why, as has been stated in the treatment of the relation of the soul with its faculties, these very faculties of the soul are reduced to the category of the soul and are consubstantial with it (14). In its acts of self-cognition, the soul passes at once from its substance to the acts which arise from it, and in so doing furnishes itself with the intelligible and the good along with the intellect to know the one and the will to love the other (15). As man, then, reaches God through memory, intelligence, and will and since he must judge of his actions which are either right or wrong, it might be well to state briefly at this point the Seraphic Doctor's teaching on conscience.

Conscience.

St. Bonaventure states that conscience is a habit of the cognoscitive faculty, namely, the intellect, and more precisely it is a habit of the practical intellect. In the *II Book of Sentences*, distinction thirty-nine, article one, question one, he mentions that conscience is taken by the doctors of Sacred Scripture according to a threefold norm. 1) It may be taken for the very thing which is known (*pro ipso conscito*). He quotes

(12) Cf. P. BOEHNER, *St. Bonaventure, op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

(13) In *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, T. II.

(14) « Ista potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem » (in *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, concl.).

(15) Cf. E. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, op. cit.*, pp. 347-348.

St. John Damascene as saying that « Conscience is the law of our intellect » (16). 2) Conscience may be taken for that by means of which we are conscious, that is, for a habit. As knowledge is accepted as a habit of the knowing subject, so too conscience may be called a habit of the one who knows. 3) Conscience may be called the knowing faculty, as when one states that the natural law is written in our conscience. Of these three ways the more common designation for conscience is that of a habit. Just as we call a science by the things of which it is composed, so also should conscience be designated by its essential constitutives.

Continuing in the same question, the Seraphic Doctor maintains that conscience is a habit of the cognitive potency. It is not a speculative science, because it is the duty of a speculative science to perfect our intellect in the speculative order. Conscience is a habit perfecting the intellect in so far as it directs the intellect in the practical order, namely, toward action (17). The intellect is in a certain manner the motivating force, not because it produces movement, but from the fact that it inclines toward action. It dictates the course of action which must be followed; it is not simply knowledge (*scientia*) but conscience (*conscientia*). This habit does not perfect the speculative intellect *in se* but is joined to will and operation. A dictate of conscience would not be « that the whole is greater than its parts » and similar principles. But conscience does dictate, « God must be honored », and the like, and such principles are equal to rules of action. Conscience belongs to the intellect; it is a habit of the practical and not of the speculative intellect. As has been stated pre-

(16) SAINT JOHN DAMASCENE, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus, edited by E. M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 3 (New York, Franciscan Institute, Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, Paderborn: F. Schoningh, 1955), p. 359.

(17) « Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt, quod conscientia se tenet ex parte potentiae cognitivae, licet non se teneat, secundum quod est speculativa, sed secundum quod est practica » (in *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1). See also in *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 ad 4: « Et sic, ut proprie loquamur, synderesis dicit potentiam affectivam, in quantum naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit; conscientia vero dicit habitum intellectus practici; lex vero naturalis dicit obiectum utriusque ».

viously, the speculative and the practical intellect belong to the same cognitive potency; they differ only by extension (18). Even though conscience is in a certain sense a motivating force, yet it does not belong to the will. St. Bonaventure states along with Aristotle that the practical intellect must be distinguished from appetite and from will (19).

In the second question of the same article, St. Bonaventure continues his treatment of conscience and states that conscience is both acquired and innate. It is an innate habit, because of the light with which the soul is endowed and by reason of the first moral principles which are impressed upon it. It is an acquired habit, by reason of the cognoscible species which it can acquire, and because of its special operation, namely, that it is a rule of action. Once again he quotes three opinions in regard to the origin of our cognitive habits and states that although the manner in which these habits are innate or are acquired has caused diverse opinions, nevertheless, all agree in the fact that the habits are not entirely obtained by nature, neither are they all acquired, but just as the virtues (*virtutes consuetudinales*) (20), they may be said to be both innate and acquired.

The cognitive habits are innate by reason of the light that is impressed upon the soul. This natural light is called the *naturale iudicatorium*, and we have spoken of it in our treatment of the relation of reason to the senses. Cognitive habits are also acquired by means of species. We acquire the similitudes of things by means of the senses. Experience proves this. No one ever knew the whole or the part, except he received the species of the same and this is to apply the principle: «*Amittentes unum sensum necesse habemus unam*

(18) In *III Sent.*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2: «*Intellectus enim practicus dicitur esse intellectus extensus, secundum quod vult Philosophus [De anima, III, c. 7 et 9 (III, 469 sq)], quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus*».

(19) *De Anima*, III, c. 9 (111, 472).

(20) «*Consuetudinales dicuntur (virtutes cardinales) ratione sui principii originalis, secundum quod acquiruntur ex frequenti bene agere*» (in *III Sent.*, dist. 33, dub. 5, III, 730). In regard to St. Bonaventure's teaching on moral illumination and the moral virtues, see the excellent study of J. M. BISSEN, *L'Exemplarisme Divin selon Saint Bonaventure*, Paris, 1921, pp. 272-289.

scientiam amittere » (21). The *naturale judicatorium* directs the soul in judging both of cognoscible and of operable things. It must be noted that just as among cognoscible things some are most evident, while others, such as particular conclusions, are less evident, so too in operable matters some are most evident as *Bonum est faciendum; malum vitandum*. By reason of this light these primary principles are said to be innate in us. It suffices to know them after the reception of species without any superadded persuasion. So too is the same true with our knowledge of moral principles. They are innate because this judicatory power in man suffices to know these principles. But in order to know particular conclusions the natural light of reason is not sufficient; there is need of a certain persuasion and a new indwelling. And as we have seen that this is necessary for knowledge, so too is it the same for our acts.

Conscience implies a direct habit of judgement. It looks to operation. This in turn implies a habit, which is then both innate and acquired. This habit is innate in regard to those things which are the first dictates of reason; it is acquired in respect to that which is superadded to our knowledge. The innate habit refers to the direct light, the natural light placed in man by Almighty God. This states: «Parents are to be honored», and similar principles. The acquired habit refers to the species of the knowable thing. Man knows that he must love his father and mother. This is naturally impressed upon his intellect, but he does not have impressed upon his mind the species of his father or of his mother.

St. Bonaventure concludes this point by saying that if there are things that we know through their essence and not through their species, then in regard to these conscience can be called a habit *simpliciter* innate. There are such things, for example, to love God, to fear God, and the like. Man does not know God nor does he love God through a similitude obtained from his senses, but these affections (*affectus*) are present essentially in man's soul. And this is in accord to the teaching of St. Augustine who states that the knowledge

(21) In *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, pp. 903.

of God is naturally inserted in man. This, then, is St. Bonaventure's treatment of conscience. In a word, we may define conscience according to the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor as a habit of the practical intellect operating as a principle of action (22). This takes us once again to the theory of illumination which we have met once before and which has been explained in part. Now there is required a fuller explanation in order to understand more fully the relation of human reason to God's existence and nature, for in the teaching of the Saint of the Franciscan School, man comes directly to the knowledge of God's existence by his intellect or reason and the Saint only required of the world of sense a starting point or beginning in order that reason might arrive at that knowledge where the presence of God's action on the soul attests His very existence (23).

The Theory of Divine Illumination.

Although the theory of divine illumination holds a prominent place in the philosophy of St. Bonaventure, it must not be thought, however, that the Seraphic Doctor is the founder of this theory. He accepted this doctrine from St. Augustine and from the Augustinian tradition; it is to be found in the works of St. Bonaventure's predecessors. It might be stated at this point that the correct interpretation of the theory of illumination as propounded by St. Augustine remains obscure and has caused much discussion among students of the great Bishop of Hippo. This obscurity flows from the mixed character of the doctrine of St. Augustine, namely, the intimate union of the natural and supernatural order; further the precise limits of faith and reason, grace and nature, theology and philosophy are not carefully delineated. This is understandable when one considers the fact that the doctrine of St. Augustine presents more a drama of life and of history than a compact and precise system of ideas and in this individual and universal drama are to be found elements of both the

(22) In *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1-2, pp. 898-904.

(23) Cf. E. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

natural and supernatural order. The supernatural order prevails where grace is placed above nature, faith above reason, the will aided by grace above the intellect, and the Church above the state. All these factors constitute that Augustinianism which in the Middle Ages flourished and influenced the doctrine of many of the great thinkers of this age (24). However, in truth it must be maintained that this theory of illumination receives a full and ample development in the writings of St. Bonaventure and is placed by him in the centre of his system. It cannot be separated from the general doctrine to which it belongs.

The mere fact of divine illumination in the philosophy of St. Bonaventure should present no difficulty, for the Seraphic Doctor in accord also with the teaching of St. Thomas holds that the intellect itself is a light given by God and by which we know all things. Yet attention must be called to the continued insistence upon this thesis of divine illumination throughout the work of St. Bonaventure. It is present in all his writings and the reader is constantly reminded of this divine illumination. In this regard the text of the *Epistle of St. James* holds a special place: «Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration» (25). Not only does the Saint use this text but it forms a part of some of his most important opuscles (26). Further still, the generality of divine illumination as contained in this text is wonderfully fitted to St. Bonaventure's thought, for in the mind of the Seraphic Doctor the illumination of the intellect is only one particular form of general illumination in which is to be found not only knowledge but the gifts of grace with their corresponding virtues and fruits (27).

(24) Cf. J. DI NAPOLI, *Manuale Philosophiae*, op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 178-186. See also the excellent pages on this question by M. C. D'ARCY, *The Philosophy of St. Augustine*, a series of essays on St. Augustine (New York, Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), pp. 178-186.

(25) Chap. 1, v. 17.

(26) *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, 1-5; *Breviloquium*, prol. 2; *Itinerarium*, prol. 1.

(27) «Deus, qui dixit de tenebris lucem splendescere etc. Verbum istud scriptum est in secunda Epistola ad Corinthios, in quo apostolus Paulus, doctor magnus, explicat ipsius scientiae donum; et explicat ipsum

It is through the notion of being that we know God. Hence in the fifth chapter of the *Itinerarium* St. Bonaventure takes up the problem of being and its relation to God. All truth is based on being. That we know something with certainty means that something really exists. God is the source of all truth and things are true in so far as they have their foundation in the Divine Mind, the source of all truth. We have seen the threefold way in which things may exist; in themselves, in the knowing subject, and in the Divine Mind itself (28). These three relations constitute ontological truth. Yet it is precisely because things express the pattern that exists in the Divine Mind that we have truth as such. As St. Anselm says: «Everything is truth by the first truth» (29). It is the doctrine and the teaching of St. Bonaventure that all things are true and are so constituted to express themselves through the expression of this highest light. If this light would cease or fail to exercise its influence all things would cease to be true. Whence concludes rightly the Seraphic Doctor no created truth is true by essence but by participation (30).

donum quantum ad antecedentia et subsequentia. Donum scientiae duo antecedunt: unum est sicut lumen innatum, et aliud est sicut lumen infusum. Lumen innatum est lumen naturalis iudicatorii sive rationis; lumen superinfusum est lumen fidei. Quantum ad primum dicit: Deus, qui dixit lucem splendescere, id est lumen naturalis iudicatorii impressit creaturae rationali, id est non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem. Quantum ad lumen fidei superinfusum dicit: illuxit in cordibus nostris etc.; scilicet per infusionem lucis fidei. Deus naturam rationalem condidit et superaddidit gratiam » (*De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, collatio, IV, 2, T. V, p. 474).

« L'illumination intellectuelle, dit avec raison Gilson, n'est à ses yeux (de Saint Bonaventure) qu'un cas particulier de l'illumination général qui comprend, en même temps que la science, les dons de la grâce avec leurs vertus et leurs fruits » (J. M. BISSEN, *L'Exemplarisme Divin selon Saint Bonaventure*, p. 281).

(28) « Dicendum quod veritas habet triplicem comparisonem. Habet enim comparari ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat et ad intellectum quem excitat. In comparatione ad subiectum veritatis dicitur veritas actus et potentiae indivisio. In comparatione ad principium dicitur veritas summae unitatis et primae repraesentatio sive imitatio. In comparatione ad intellectum dicitur veritas ratio discernendi » (in *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, p. 151).

(29) In libro *De Veritate*, cap. 13 (PL 158, 484 sq.).

(30) « Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent

We know that God is the source of all ontological truth and St. Bonaventure making the necessary qualifications states that God is also the principle of logical truth. It is in the fourth question of *De Scientia Christi* that St. Bonaventure proves this with a wealth and an abundance of proofs taken from St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory, St. Anselm, etc., and finally by other rational proofs. Excluding the proofs from authority, let us examine several of the rational proofs for the statement that God is the principle of logical truth.

In our judgments there is something immutable, necessary, and infallible. This cannot be the product of our intellect, for it is finite, mutable, and contingent. Hence there is something above us, influencing us to perform these judgments. This influence is God (31). Again, how can an unjust man know justice? Certainly not from an abstract similitude taken from sensible things. The concept of justice is a metaphysical concept; it is something spiritual. Since a man is unjust, he cannot know it of himself. Hence he must know it from something which is above himself. He must know it in the eternal reasons (32).

Another proof is taken from the fact that if we did not know the perfect and the positive, we could not know that a

esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem » (*ibid.*, ad 4-7, p. 151).

(31) « Omne immutabile est superius mutabili; sed illud quo certitudinaliter cognoscitur est immutabile, quia verum necessarium; sed mens nostra est mutabilis: ergo illud quo cognoscimus est supra mentes nostras. Sed quod est supra mentes nostras non est nisi Deus et veritas aeterna: ergo illud quo est cognitio est divina veritas et ratio sempiterna » (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, 17, p. 19). See also q. 4, 21, p. 19: « Item, omne necessarium est interminabile, quia nullo modo potest nec poterit aliter se habere; sed illud quo certitudinaliter scimus est verum necessarium: ergo interminabile. Sed omne tale est supra omne creatum, cum omnis creatura prodierit de non-esse ad esse, et quantum est de se, sit vertibilis in non esse: ergo illud quo cognoscimus excedit omne verum creatum, ergo est verum increatum ».

(32) « Item, cum impius homo cognoscit iustitiam, aut cognoscit eam per sui praesentiam, aut per similitudinem acceptam ab extra, aut per aliquid, quod est supra; sed non per eius praesentiam, cum illa non sit praesens se; non per speciem acceptam ab extra, cum non habeat similitudinem abstrahibilem per sensum: ergo necesse est, quod cognoscat illam per aliquid aliud, quod est supra intellectum suum; pari ratione et omnia alia cognoscibilia spiritualia, quae cognoscit » (*ibid.*, 23, p. 19).

thing was defective (33). In order to know the imperfect, we must know the perfect. Yet we know something absolute. We posit perfections in God, even though our minds attain only the contingent and the mutable (34). It is well to state that for the Seraphic Doctor the notions of God's infinity, necessity, eternity are positive and not negative. Another reason for the influence of God upon our knowledge is seen from the fact that the human mind knows purely intelligible things. We know ethics, mathematics, the laws of logic, and the values of beauty. How do we know these purely intelligible objects since there is no common sensible? The answer must be that there is a common intelligible object for all men (35). In stating this

(33) « Item, nullum ens defectivum, quantum est de se, cognoscitur nisi per ens perfectum; sed omne verum creatum, quantum est de se, est tenebra et defectus: ergo nihil in intellectu cadit nisi per illud summum verum » (*ibid.*, 25 p. 19). See also BOETHIUS, III *De Consolatione*: « Omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur id imminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit; etenim perfectione sublata unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur exstiterit ne fingi quidem potest » [ANICHI MANLI SEVERINI BOETHII, *Philosophiae Consolatio*, edidit L. BIELER, in *Corpus Christianorum*, Series Latina XCIV (Turnholti, Typographi Brepols, 1958)], p. 53.

(34) « Ens autem, cum possit cogitari ut diminutum et ut completum, ut imperfectum et ut perfectum, ut ens in potentia et ut ens in actu, ut ens secundum quid et ut ens simpliciter, ut ens in parte et ut ens totaliter, ut ens transiens et ut ens manens, ut ens per aliud et ut ens per se, ut ens permixtum non-enti et ut ens purum, ut ens dependens et ut ens absolutum, ut ens posterius et ut ens prius, ut ens mutabile et ut ens immutabile, ut ens simplex et ut ens compositum; cum "privationes et defectus nullatenus possint cognosci nisi per positiones" (AVERROËS, in III *De anima*, Tex. 25), non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum, nisi iuvetur ab intellectu entis purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi et absoluti; quod est ens simpliciter et aeternum, in quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate. Quomodo autem sciret intellectus, hoc esse ens defectivum et incompletum, si nullam haberet cognitionem entis absque omni defectu? Et sic de aliis conditionibus praelibatis » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 3, p. 304).

(35) « Cognitio eiusdem sensibilis a diversis simul et semel non potest haberi nisi per aliquod commune, et pari ratione cognitio eiusdem intelligibilis; sed aliquod unum verum nullo modo multiplicatum a diversis potest intelligi, sicut et enuntiari; ergo necesse est, quod per aliquod unum nullo modo multiplicatum intelligatur. Sed unum in diversis nullo modo multiplicatum non potest esse nisi Deus: ergo ratio intelligendū unumquodque est ipsa veritas, quae est Deus » (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, 28, p. 20).

we touch upon a problem which has taxed the minds of all great thinkers in all ages.

If it be true that all errors are attempts at solving great truths, here is one particular case in which this saying is verified and here is one problem that has taxed the minds of all philosophers even to modern times. It was precisely in trying to solve this important question that Plato introduced his doctrine of the Anamnesis; for him intellectual cognition was not the acquiring of new content of knowledge but the reawakening and the recalling of a knowledge already possessed; in a word, it is nothing other than reminiscence. To understand better this problem it suffices to recall that in the Aristotelic-Scholastic tradition of thought philosophy begins with being and that the problem of knowledge consists precisely in taking into account whether or not the impressions which the being makes upon the knowing subject are in conformity with the thing known. In its ultimate analysis it remains a problem of truth: *Adaequatio intellectus et rei*, in which it is ascertained whether or not the impressions on the sensitive and intellectual faculties are in correspondence and in accord with the object which exists outside of the knowing faculty.

The theory or hypothesis of a separate intellect by means of which we are able to know the intelligible was first sustained by the Commentators of the doctrine of Aristotle. The Stagerite himself, so it would seem, did not clearly state whether the twofold intellect (the possible and active intellect) was proper to each soul, or whether there existed one intellect *agens* which was common to all men — each man having his own proper possible intellect — or whether there was only one active and one possible intellect for all. Among the Greeks, Theophrastus, Themistius, Philoponus held that the two intellects were proper to each soul. Alexander of Aphrodisias held the opinion that the active intellect was divine, immortal, and the same for all; the possible intellect was the very individual soul itself and was material and mortal.

Avicenna was of the opinion that both intellects were spiritual, but the active intellect was a divine light emanating and coming from God, common to all men yet outside of man. This light illuminated and communicated the intelligible spe-

cies by means of which the possible intellect knows. Averroës posited three intellects, the active intellect, the potential intellect, and the possible intellect. The active and potential intellect were immortal and one for all men, while the possible intellect, although a cogitative faculty, was sensitive and mortal (36).

In the Middle Ages, Christian philosophers sought to join or harmonize the Aristotelian-Arabic doctrine with the Augustinian doctrine of illumination. Thus in the twelfth century, Dominic Gundisalvi, a deep student of Avicenna, set forth the teaching that the intellect agent was to be understood as God Himself. This thesis was accepted by Roger Bacon who in his work *Opus Maius* (ed. Bridges, Oxford 1897, p. 143), attributes the same teaching to William of Auvergne, Robert Grosseteste, and Adam Marsh. John Rochelle, author also of a *Summa de anima* (ed. Domenichelli, Prato, 1882), speaks of the active and possible intellect as corresponding to the *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior* of St. Augustine. Representative also of such a current of thought was Alexander of Hales who sustained that the active and the possible intellect united in the soul in a certain way similar to the union of matter and form (*Summa*, II, q. 69) (37).

Alexander did not know as yet the Averroistic teaching concerning the unicity of the intellect which soon became the *punctum dolens* of scholastic dispute. In the *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, concl., of St. Bonaventure, we find the Averroistic doctrine exactly resumed and cited and we see the Seraphic

(36) Cf. J. DI NAPOLI, *Manuale Philosophiae* (Romae, Marietti, 1954), II, pp. 74-75.

(37) Cf. M. C. D'ARCY, *The Philosophy of St. Augustine*, op. cit., p. 180: «At that time when Scholasticism ripened, the influence of Arabian Aristotelianism led to the interpretation of the doctrine of illumination in terms of the active intellect. Hence William of Auvergne taught that God was as it were the book from which the human mind reads all the principles of knowledge, and Roger Bacon definitely calls God the active intellect of man. M. PORTALIÉ (*Dictionnaire de Théologie*), inclines to think that when all the texts are considered, this view is the nearest to St. Augustine's meaning. M. BOYER (*L'idée de la Vérité*), on the other hand, follows Kleutgen, Zigliara and Lepidi in so assimilating St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas that their views become indistinguishable save by accent».

Doctor as a strong adversary of this false teaching (38). Thus between 1250-53 the Averroistic doctrine found its way into the West and Christianity witnesses the Catholic theologians, especially of the University of Paris, admirably united in order to offset the dangerous consequences of such a teaching. For St. Albert the Great the active intellect is a part of the soul (*Metaph.*, XI, 1, 91), having in itself a twofold function, namely to abstract the intelligible and to illuminate the possible intellect (*Summa Theol.*, II, 14, 3). St. Thomas in his *Contra Gentiles* (1259-60), dedicates a large space to the confutation of the unity of the intellect, attacking in particular Averroës. For St. Thomas, the agent intellect is a power of the soul and as such it must not be one for all men but must be multiplied as souls are multiplied. In the *Summa Theologiae* (I, q. 76, a. 1), he again refutes the Averroistic teaching and the opinion which states that the intellect is united to the body as a motor and this in such a way that the operation of the intellect can be attributed to all. The *opusculum, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* of 1272, is directed in particular against Siger de Brabant, the staunch defender of the Averroistic teachings at Paris, and constitutes the principal document of this great polemic (39). Thus in conclusion of this point we may say

(38) « Quantumcumque autem hanc opinionem coloret, pessima est et haeretica. Est enim contra christianam religionem, dum aufert meritorum retributionem, quae non esset si omnium anima una esset. — Est etiam contra rectam rationem. Planum est enim quod anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva est, est perfectio hominis secundum quod homo. Si ergo homines non sunt diversi solum secundum quod animalia, sed secundum quod homines, non solum habent diversas imaginationes et animas sensibiles, immo etiam diversos intellectus et animas rationales. — Est etiam contra sensibilem experientiam, quoniam diversi homines diversas habent et contrarias cogitationes et affectiones. Quodsi tu dicas quod hoc venit ex diversitate specierum existentium in imaginatione, hoc nihil est, quia non solummodo diversificantur in his intelligibilibus quae extrahuntur a sensu, immo etiam in his quae sunt supra omnem imaginationem, sicut sunt virtutes, quae intelliguntur per suam essentiam, non per speciem imaginariam, sicut etiam est ipse Deus, quem quidam diligunt, quidam contemnunt. Hanc igitur positionem repudiando tamquam haeticam et falsam, dicendum est secundum fidem et veritatem quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales, et concedendae sunt rationes hoc probantes » (in *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, concl., pp. 446-447).

(39) See the excellent article of A. Guzzo - V. MATHIEU, *Intelletto*, in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, ed. Gallarate II (1957), 1442-1445. Cf. also the

that Christian philosophy in order to refute these conclusions so dangerous to faith and to Catholic teaching has affirmed and maintained that the agent intellect is the same as the human soul, namely, it is a special activity of the cognitive soul, individual and immanent in every human person, and which activity is capable of abstracting the universal forms from the individuating characteristics (40).

With the advent of Modern Philosophy, the problem of knowledge revolves around the question as to whether the knowing subject can have any knowledge of objects distinct and separate from himself and from his subjective impressions. Thus the common origin and beginning of Rationalism and Empiricism are to be found in the phenomenalist prejudice that man does not know things directly but ascertains only the impressions which these various objects make upon him. If these impressions are made on the intellect, the system is Rationalism; if they are made on the senses, it is Empiricism. In both systems of thought, being is not presupposed to knowledge; the only data are these impressions which our consciousness tells us exist within us. In a word, the problem of knowledge becomes a question in epistemology, an endeavor to determine and to establish the limits of man's knowledge, and this problem reaches its full awakening in Kant who with his *Criticism* showed that neither Rationalism nor Empiricism was a sufficient and adequate solution to the problem of knowledge and who by his *Criticism* led the way to the two major philosophical systems of the last century, namely,

pages of B. A. LUYCK, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, Münster, 1923, pp. 58-85, who also gives the following interesting bibliography on this question: C. DELORME, *Roger Bacon*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, vol. II, pp. 13-14; O. KEICHER, *Der intellectus agens bei Roger Baco*, Münster, 1913; H. SPETTMANN, *Joannis Pechami quaestiones tractantes de anima*, Münster, 1918; J. A. ENDRES, *Des Alexander von Hales Leben und psychologische Lehre*, in *Philos. Jahrb.*, I (1888), 273; G. M. MANSE, *Johann von Rupella, ein Beitrag zu seiner Charakteristik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung*, in *Jahrb. für Phil. u. spec. Theol.*, B. XXVI (1912); P. MANDONNET, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme Latin*, Louvain, 1908-11, I, 239 ff.

(40) Cf. CARMIN MASCIA, *A. History of Philosophy* (Paterson, New Jersey, St. Anthony Guild Press, 1957), p. 291 sq. See the interesting pages of E. GILSON, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (London, Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 49-60.

Idealism and Positivism and from which systems comes contemporary Existentialism (41).

What was the Seraphic Doctor's teaching on this matter? To return to the original question, namely, how do we know these purely intelligible objects since there is no common sensible, St. Bonaventure following St. Augustine states that they are known in the one divine mind, God. He explained this communion which all minds have by attributing it to the immediate interference of God (42). Hence God is truth. He is both the principle of ontological truth and of logical truth. This again the Seraphic Doctor tells us when he writes: « Just as God is the cause of being, so too He is the reason of knowing and the order of living; but God is thus the cause of being, because nothing can be effected by any cause, unless God Himself move the one operating by His eternal power; therefore nothing can be understood, unless God immediately illustrates the one knowing by His eternal truth » (43).

Up to this point in our study of the theory of illumination, we have seen that there is a contact between the human mind and truth, which is God. As such, there exists a relation between the human mind and the eternal reasons, thus giving to man a knowledge of certain, absolute, necessary, and eternal objects. The problem is to understand correctly this relation between the soul and God. To do so we state as starting prem-

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 380 sq.

(42) « Unum in diversis nullo modo multiplicatum non potest esse nisi Deus. Ergo ratio intelligendi unumquodque est ipsa veritas quae est Deus » (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, 28, p. 20).

(43) « Item, sicut Deus est causa essendi, ita est ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi; sed Deus sic est causa essendi, quod nihil potest ab aliqua causa effici, quin ipse se ipso et sua aeterna virtute moveat operantem; ergo nihil potest intelligi, quin ipse sua aeterna veritate immediate illustret intelligentem » (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, 24, p. 19). « Dieu est la lumière de notre esprit, non seulement parce qu'il nous donne la faculté de connaître et parce qu'il a allumé dans notre esprit le flambeau de la raison; il l'est encore d'une manière beaucoup plus éminente parce que les similitudes dans lesquelles il voit et connaît le chose sont également le motif de notre connaissance a nous, être créés. A juste titre, il est appelé notre *ratio intelligendi*; et c'est précisément en tant qu'il est cette *ratio intelligendi* qu'il entre en notre ame comme le soleil qui l'éclaire » (J. M. BISSEN, *L'exemplarisme Divin selon Saint Bonaventure*, p. 287).

ise something that the Seraphic Doctor does not teach, namely, that this contact which the soul has with God must be understood in such a way as to make God the only and total cause of our knowledge. Such a statement would be equal to saying that we know only through and only in God. This is not St. Bonaventure's doctrine, for as has been seen, he admits sense cognition. Further, if such were the case, our knowledge here on earth would be comparable to the beatific vision in heaven. This is rejected by the Seraphic Doctor and as has been previously stated he is opposed to any ontologism or to any teaching that would make God the direct object of our immediate knowledge (44).

The doctrine maintaining that the eternal reasons only influence our thought is likewise untenable. Mention of this has already been made when the relation between reason and the senses was discussed. By influence is here intended something created which is passed on to the intellect. It is not to be taken as an active or co-operative influence, for as such it would be equal to a *habitus mentis*. Such a solution is not satisfactory for the Seraphic Doctor, because it is not in accord with the teaching of St. Augustine who held that in a cognition of certitude the eternal rules govern our intellect not in the sense of a *habitus mentis* but by something above the mind and in the eternal truth (45). Again such an

(44) Cf. J. M. BISSEN, *L'exemplarisme Divin selon Saint Bonaventure*, pp. 192-193: « Et l'on aura pas de peine à conclure avec Zigliara que le Séraphique n'est nullement ontologiste, quelle que soit d'ailleurs la manière dont on entende cette erreur » (T. M. ZIGLIARA, *De la lumière intellectuelle et de l'ontologisme*, p. 484). See also J. FR. BONNEFOY, *Le Saint-Esprit et Ses Dons selon Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1922), pp. 178-179; Z. VAN DE WOESTYNE, *Notio ontologismi* in *Antonianum*, III (1928), pp. 33-64; B. A. LUYCK, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, op. cit., p. 242 sq.; P. E. LONGPRÉ, *La théologie mystique de Saint Bonaventure*, in *Arch. Franc. Hist.*, XIX (1921), p. 90 sq.

(45) « Et hic quidem modus dicendi est insufficiens secundum verba Beati Augustini, qui verbis expressis et rationibus ostendit, quod mens in certitudinali cognitione per incommutabiles et aeternas regulas habeat regulari, non tanquam per habitum suae mentis, sed tanquam per eas quae sunt supra se in veritate aeterna. Et ideo dicere, quod mens nostra in cognoscendo non extendat se ultra influentiam lucis increatae, est dicere, Augustinum deceptum fuisse, cum auctoritates ipsius exponendo non sit facile ad istum sensum trahere; et hoc valde absurdum est dicere de tanto Patre et Doctore maxime authentico inter omnes expositores sacrae Scripturae » (*De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, p. 23).

influence may be either general or special. If it is general, then it is equal to that influence by which all creatures are constituted and conserved in being. If it is special, then it would be similar to grace, a *habitus infusus*. In such a case, there would be no acquired or innate knowledge (46). Thus it may be stated that the Seraphic Doctor does not acknowledge any direct vision of the eternal rules neither does he admit any knowledge created in man by a special act of God. Further, for him the natural light with which God has endowed our intellect is not sufficient to explain this certitude. He offers a third solution for the explanation of the interference of the eternal rules with our knowledge of certitude. This solution lies between the two previously-mentioned ones which the Seraphic Doctor has rejected and may be stated as follows.

There are two factors in our cognition, the eternal rules which act as the regulators and movers of our thought and there is the created intellect. Now the eternal rule is not seen in its totality but only partially and it is seen with the created factor. It is *contuita* not *intuita* (47). This is our actual state here on earth.

For certain knowledge there must be immutability on the part of the object and infallibility on the side of the knower. Further this can only be verified in God, namely, as the object

(46) « Praetera, illa lucis influentia aut est generalis, quantum Deus influit in omnibus creaturis, aut est specialis, sicut Deus influit per gratiam. Si est generalis; ergo Deus non magis debet dici dator sapientiae quam fecundator terrae, nec magis ab eo diceretur esse scientia quam pecunia; si specialis, cuiusmodi est in gratia; ergo secundum hoc omnis cognitio est infusa, et nulla est acquisita vel innata; quae omnia sunt absurda » (*ibid.*, p. 23).

(47) « Quanto alla contuitio, essa non è una *intuizione* di Dio immediata, faccia a faccia. Non immediata, perchè è una ascensione dal creato all'increato, dal visibile all'invisibile; non *faccia a faccia*, perchè questo suppone una adeguazione del soggetto all'oggetto impossibile tra il finito e l'infinito. Ma se fra l'uomo e Dio non vi è adeguazione, vi è però una proporzione: l'intelletto umano è *in potenza all'infinito*; perciò partendo dal finito l'uomo "contuisce" l'infinito al termine della sua operazione intellettuale. Questa "contuizione" non è di Dio in se; ma non è neppure dell'ordine dell'*astrazione* che si ferma ad un'idea astratta e concettuale; la contuizione si ferma alla realtà concreta infinita, non vista *in se*, ma percepita nell'*intelletto* come termine della sua operazione e di tutto l'ordine dell'essere (L. VEUTHEY, *Bonaventura* (s.), in *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, p. 751).

exists in the eternal reasons and as it is known by God (48). Through his superior reason, man is in contact with the eternal reasons (49). He is related to God in three ways; he is a vestige of God; he is an image of God, and he is likewise a similitude of God. Now according to St. Bonaventure, a vestige of God has God solely as a principle; an image of God possesses God as an object, while a similitude has God as an infused gift (50). Hence there is a difference and in such a way as the creature is related to the Creator, so does the Maker co-operate in the activity of the creature. That which is a vestige of God has Him as its Creator. A similitude possesses Him as an infused gift towards meritorious acts. An image of God has Him as its moving factor towards certain cognition. It is because man is an image of God that he is contact with and capable of God.

Man enjoys only a partial vision of the eternal rules precisely because he is an image of God and has not attained the complete similitude. He sees the eternal reasons but dimly; yet the eternal reasons act as the *ratio motiva* and *ratio regulans*, controlling and forcing the uncertainty and mutability of man's thought under a certain and inevitable law. While man's

(48) Cf. *De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, p. 23.

(49) « Cum enim spiritus rationalis habeat superiorem portionem rationis et inferiorem; sicut ad plenum iudicium rationis deliberativum in agendis non sufficit portio inferior sine superiori, sic et ad plenum rationis iudicium in speculandis. Haec autem portio superior est illa, in qua est imago Dei, quae et aeternis regulis inhaerescit et per eas quidquid definit certitudinaliter iudicat et definit; et hoc competit ei, in quantum est imago Dei » (*ibid.*, p. 24).

(50) « Creatura enim comparatur ad Deum in ratione vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis. In quantum vestigium, comparatur ad Deum ut principium; in quantum imago, comparatur ad Deum ut ad obiectum; sed in quantum similitudo, comparatur ad Deum ut ad donum infusum. Et ideo omnis creatura est vestigium, quae est a Deo; omnis est imago, quae cognoscit Deum; omnis et sola est similitudo, in qua habitat Deus. Et secundum istum triplicem gradum comparationis triplex est gradus divinae cooperationis » (*ibid.*, p. 24). See also in *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2 *in fine*: « Alia differentia est penes ea in quibus reperiuntur. Quoniam enim omnis creatura comparatur ad Deum in ratione causae et in ratione triplicis causae, ideo omnis creatura est umbra vel vestigium. Sed quoniam sola rationalis creatura comparatur ad Deum ut obiectum, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem: ideo sola est imago ». Cf. in *II Sent.*, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3; *Breviloquium*, p. 2, c. 12; *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, coll. 2, n. 20 sq., coll. 3, n. 3 sq.

thought is mutable, it is the very immutability of divine truth which, although it is but dimly and faintly seen by man's intellect, gives to his knowledge the very transcendent character and mark of necessity, immutability, and of absoluteness. Not only do the eternal reasons control but they move man's thought, for the superior reason seeing beyond the contingency of created things is moved toward the eternal and immutable idea even though this idea is but dimly seen. Thus because of the eternal reasons we are able to obtain certain cognition of objects which surpass the capacity of the mind and which are common to all men. These eternal reasons, although they are only faintly perceived and seen only in connection with created beings, and not in their full clarity and distinctiveness, are always present. Once again it is stated that the Seraphic Doctor does not admit any direct vision of the divine truth or essence that would touch of ontology.

Such an ontologistic doctrine is entirely foreign to St. Bonaventure's teaching and is not even admitted by him to hold for the complete mystical union of the soul with God (51). This light shines dimly through creatures. It is not intuition; it is contuition. The ideas are seen by the mind, as it were, through a veil. We are now ready to discuss the important question: «How do we know God? How do we know that being who is the foundation of all truth and certainty? If there is a light which shines upon us and helps us to form true judgments, to have certain knowledge, do we know this light? St. Bonaventure says yes, and here we come once again to a doctrine which shows the beauty and sublimity of the Seraphic Doctor's teaching.

(51) «In hoc autem transitu, si sit perfectus, oportet quod relinquatur omnes intellectuales operationes, et apex affectus totus transferratur et transformetur in Deum» (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, VII, 4, T. V, p. 313). Cf. T. M. ZIGLIARA, *Della luce intellettuale e dell'ontologismo* (Roma, Tipografia Cattolica di F. Chiapperini e C., 1874), vol. 1, p. 431: «Ho studiato a lungo gli argomenti, non ho taciuto le difficoltà, mi sono studiato soprattutto di conciliare San Bonaventura con San Bonaventura, recando le dottrine magistrali della Sentenza per dilucidare le dottrine mistico-teologiche dell'Itinerario. Ritengo pertanto che il Serafico non sia punto ontologista».

In the preceding pages, an analysis of the act of certain cognition as explained and illustrated by St. Bonaventure has been set forth and in so doing the theory of illumination which is intimately connected with this intellectual process has been studied. Now we are ready to analyse the cognition of that being and truth which is God. The Seraphic Doctor teaches that to resolve and to have a knowledge that is full and perfect signifies to reduce it to its ultimate basis which is God (52). Concerning a statement or a proposition it means to find the ultimate and final conditions under which the truth of such a statement or proposition is possible. As has been constantly maintained, these conditions are those of necessity and infallibility. Now being is the primary notion of our mind, for without being nothing can be understood. In order to know the «nothing» we must know that something exists. Thus it is the idea or notion of being which first penetrates and forces itself upon our intellect. Such a being cannot be some particular, dependent, or analogous being, for such a being can be most easily thought of as not existing. It must then be being without potency, without determination or limitation; in a word, it must be the purest and most actual being, the *esse primum* (53). Here it must be remembered that we have a Christian mind contemplating the divine being. Its mind is fixed on the *ipsum esse* shining through the veil of the being of every creature. «Moved by it and forced by its unerring, though dim, light, it becomes aware of that being which is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be. It is the being itself, the first being, the purest and most actual being, that leaps to

(52) «In iudicando deliberativa nostra pertingit ad divinas leges, si plena resolutione dissolvat» (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 4, T. V, p. 305).

(53) «Cum autem non-esse privatio sit essendi, non cadit in intellectum nisi per esse; esse autem non cadit per aliud, quia omne, quod intelligitur ut non ens, aut ut ens in potentia, aut ut ens in actu. Si igitur non-ens non potest intelligi nisi per ens, et ens in potentia non nisi per ens in actu; et esse nominat ipsum purum actum entis: esse igitur est quod primo cadit in intellectu, et illud esse est quod est purus actus» (*Itinerarium, Mentis in Deum*, c. 5, 3, T. V, p. 308).

our mind, as soon as we fix our mind on being itself, in an act of contemplation » (54).

It must not be understood, however, that the mind in its present state is always aware of the presence of this being. In our present state the mind is intent upon particular things, upon particular beings, without perceiving the being which occurs to us beneath all these particular beings (55). What the spiritual man, the contemplative, sees as the being above all being in his act of contemplation is there for everyone. It is present dimly and faintly; yet it is there even though we are unaware of its presence and can be seen in the perception of any being. Thus it is through the being of God which shines through the being of creatures, faint and dim as it may be, that we come to an idea of that being which possesses the essential predicates of necessity, absoluteness, and eternity. Again, it must be remembered that this idea of being is not a construction of various negations and privations, but of positions under the influence and guidance of that being which is these very ideas in their totality. Any theory of analogy of being, if it would be correct, must consider both terms of comparison. The Seraphic Doctor provides us with this, namely, with the created being which is known by experience and with the increated being known by the illuminated reason and shining through the fog and haze of created beings. Hence it is that the existence of God cannot be doubted. If we completely

(54) P. BOEHNER, *St. Bonaventure* (manuscript), *op. cit.*, p. 103.

(55) « Mira igitur est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud quod prius videt et sine quo nihil potest cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus intentus in varias colorum differentias lucem, per quam videt cetera, non videt, et si videt, non advertit; sic oculus mentis nostrae, intentus in entia particularia et universalia, ipsum esse extra omne genus, licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit » (*Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, c. 5, 4, T. V, p. 309).

« The failure of the mind to recognize the infinite being, which is in itself the first and most intelligible object of knowledge and the cause of the knowledge of all other objects, Saint Bonaventure attributes to a "strange blindness". This blindness is explained by a comparison with physical vision. This comparison serves, too, to make clear the manner in which the mind knows by means of the Eternal Reasons. The object is seen in the Light, but the mind does not see the Light itself » (M. R. DADY, *The Theory of Knowledge of St. Bonaventure* (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1937), p. 93.

analyze our experience and cognition and know in just what sense we are making the assertion, then it is a veritable fact that the knowledge of God is inserted and is innate in the very soul of man, that every creature proclaims this fact, and the proposition « God exists » is in itself most certain and most evident (56).

(56) « Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile? Et quod sic, ostenditur triplice via. Prima est ista: omne verum omnibus mentibus impressum est verum indubitabile. Secunda est ista: omne verum, quod omnis creatura proclamat, est verum indubitabile. Tertia est ista: omne verum in se ipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile » (*De Mystério Trinitatis*, a. I, T. V, p. 45). See also in *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, pp. 153-155.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDUBITABILITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

In the *De Mystério Trinitatis*, St. Bonaventure introduces three ways which show forth God's existence (1). The first way has its foundation in the fact that the existence of God is a truth naturally innate in every rational soul. Here it must be remembered that this «innateness» does not mean that man sees God by His essence or that he possesses an exact knowledge of the divine nature. This innate knowledge is affirmed of God's existence and of God's existence alone. St. Bonaventure takes the precise formula of this *innatism* from Hugh of St. Victor and makes it his own, namely, that God has given such knowledge of Himself to man that man cannot totally comprehend God's nature nor can he be in entire ignorance of His existence (2). It is necessary to understand correctly and clearly the Seraphic Doctor's teaching on this important point.

The First Proof for God's Existence.

The problem here stated must be placed in the precise terms which St. Bonaventure took from St. Augustine and from St. Anselm. The question which was of paramount importance for this school of thought was whether the human

(1) *De Mystério Trinitatis*, q. I, a. 1, T. V, p. 45.

(2) HUGH of ST. VICTOR, *De Sacramentis*, I, p. 3, c. 1 (PL 176, 217): «Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam, quid esset poterat comprehendere, ita nunquam, quia esset poterat ignorari». Cited by ST. BONAVENTURE in *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, p. 154 and in *De Mystério Trinitatis*, q. I, a. 1, 2, p. 45.

mind could or could not be ignorant of God. A difficulty arises because if the idea of God is innate and is to be found in the human soul and is inseparable from it, how could people have fallen into idolatry? How could they have adored statues of wood or stone, fire, the sun, etc.? The Saint of the Franciscan School gives the answer to this difficulty by placing the distinction between God's nature and God's existence. A great difference is to be found between error as to the nature of God and ignorance of God's existence. In a certain sense it may be said that a man does have knowledge of God even though he may have mistaken views about Him. The pagan may assert of God something of which He is not; another may state that God is not what He is, as for instance, a man might accuse God of not being just, because He does not punish immediately the unjust and the impious. Each of these may be wrong about God's nature but consciously or unconsciously they are affirming His existence. It may be argued that *indirectly* they are denying God's existence by the fact that what they attribute or deny God is incompatible with His divine being; yet it cannot be said that the idolater or the lamenter against God are devoid of any idea of God or that they think that God does not exist. Contrariwise, while they persist in their very error concerning the nature of God, they are affirming His existence (3).

(3) In *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, p. 154: «Contingit autem dupliciter esse cogitationem de aliquo ente, videlicet "si est" et "quid est". Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad cognitionem "quid est", tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem "si est"... Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei "si est", ideo nec potest ignorare ipsum esse simpliciter, nec cogitare non esse. Quia vero deficit in cognitione "quid est", ideo frequenter cogitat Deum esse quod non est, sicut idolum, vel non esse quod est, sicut Deum iustum. Et quia qui cogitat Deum non esse quod est, ut iustum, per consequens cogitat ipsum non esse: ideo ratione defectus intellectus Deus potest cogitari non esse sive summa veritas; non tamen simpliciter sive generaliter, sed ex consequenti, sicut qui negat beatitudinem esse in Deo, negat eum esse». See also *De Mystero Trinitatis* for the same argument, I, 1, ad 1, p. 50: «Per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de idolo. Ideo enim gentilis cogitat, Deum esse idolum, quia ipsius apprehensio de Deo est defectiva; non enim apprehendit ipsum ut summum et optimum, sed ut aliquid potens, quod homo non potest; et hinc venit in eo error deceptionis et nutatio dubitationis, in quem errorem ipse se propria pertinacia praecipitat, ut prorsus inex-

To substantiate his statement that the existence of God is a truth naturally innate in every rational soul St. Bonaventure adduces and enlarges upon reasons in support of his affirmation. Man's innate desire for wisdom, truth, happiness, and peace can only be satisfied if there be an eternal wisdom, truth, and happiness which is God. If the soul has any immediate knowledge of itself, and according to St. Bonaventure it has, how much more must God be present in it for it is upon Him that the soul depends for its knowledge. Here we have an intelligible present to an intelligible and even though the one be infinitely superior to the other there is nothing contrary to the possibility of such a knowledge. If for human knowledge there were required a strict proportion between the knowing subject and the object known, human reason would never come to the knowledge of God, for the soul of man cannot be proportioned to God neither by nature, nor by grace, nor by glory (4). The adequate proportion which is required between a knowing subject and its object for any definition of essence is not even required for the mere awareness of its existence. A mere relation of aptitude or a certain compatibility would be sufficient in order that an infinite God might naturally be known by man. This relation of human reason to God does exist, for the soul of man is by nature fit to know all because it can be likened to all and this is especially true in regard to God in whose image and likeness man has been made (5). Thus man's innate knowledge of God's existence is

cusabilis fiat; nec tamen ipse omnino privatus est a cognitione Dei, quia, quamvis ex sua perversitate velit colere idolum, instinctum tamen naturalem habet ad colendum Deum, contra quem pugnat se praecipitando in errorem voluntarium ».

(4) « Inserta est animae rationali notitia sui, eo quod anima sibi praesens est et se ipsa cognoscibilis; sed Deus praesentissimus est ipsi animae et se ipso cognoscibilis: ergo inserta est ipsi animae notitia Dei sui. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia anima est sibi proportionalis, non sic Deus proportionalis animae, contra: nulla est instantia: quia, si ad cognitionem necessario requireretur proportionalitas, anima nunquam ad Dei notitiam perveniret, quia proportionari ei non potest, nec per naturam, nec per gratiam, nec per gloriam » (*De Mysterio Trinitatis*, I, 1, 10, p. 46).

(5) « Item, anima sicut dicit Philosophus (ARIST., *de anima*, III, c. 8, III, 470), secundum intellectum quodam modo est omnia; sed hoc non esset nisi potentia intellectiva, cum sit una, nata esset cognoscere

founded and radicated in the wonderful harmony existing between these two intelligibles, one of which is the very cause and archetype of the other (6).

The Second Proof for God's Existence.

The second way which the Seraphic Doctor adopts to prove the indubitability of God's existence is the fact that all creatures proclaim His existence. In proof of this statement St. Bonaventure, following the principle of sufficient reason, draws his arguments from the properties or conditions to be found in every creature, for if God is in truth the cause and the reason of all things, then He must be found in His effects. These arguments offered by the Seraphic Doctor in statement of this truth and as found in the *De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, 11-20, may be set forth in the following manner.

It is an evident fact that all created things are imperfect and finite and their reason for existence must be found in another. If there is anything that is brought into being, there must be a first being, capable of producing such an effect. If there is anything that depends for its origin, for its activities, for its very purpose of existence upon another, then there must be a being that exists by itself and for itself. If there is a composite being, and we find that all created beings are composite, then there must be a being that is simple, for the very word composite signifies the absence of simplicity. If

omnia » (in *II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2, f. 2). See also *ibid.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, f. 2; in *Hexaemeron*, 4, 6: « Vult autem anima totum mundum describi in se ».

(6) « Est enim certum ipsi comprehendenti, quia cognitio huius veri innati est menti rationali, in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quem naturaliter tendit, ut in illo possit beatificari » (*De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, 1, Concl., T. V, p. 49). See E. GILSON, the *Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-123; P. BIANCHI, *Doctrina S. Bonaventurae de Analogia Universali* (Zara: S. Francesco Tipografia Commerciale Zaratina, 1940), p. 40: « Anima igitur quatenus immaterialis et spiritualis, quatenus rationalis et intelligens, est ad Dei imaginem. Haec veritas ceterum ab omnibus Scholasticis expolita, saepissime affirmatur a S. Bonaventura ». For an interesting study of the soul as an image of God see P. BIANCHI, *ibid.*, chapter IV, « De analogica repraesentatione Dei in rationali creatura », pp. 61-86.

there is a being composed of potency and act, then there must exist a being that is pure actuality, for nothing created can be of itself pure actuality. If there is a being in motion then there must be one that is unmoved, for all motion has its foundation in that which is unmoved. If there exists a being that is relative, then there must be one that is absolute, for every creature may be classified in one or other genus. But that which may be placed in either one or the other genera cannot be the sufficient reason for itself neither for another. If there is a being through participation, then there must be a being that exists of itself and is the reason for all participated being. We find that all created beings are mutable and changeable; hence there must be an immutable and absolute being upon which all other beings depend (7). Here it must be noted that none of the proofs offered by the Seraphic Doctor based upon the field of sense is worked out with anything resembling the carefully planned and logical argumentation of St. Thomas. For not having elaborated his thought on this point and for not having made better use of the text of Aristotle, the Seraphic Doctor has been criticized. But it must be stated in defence of St. Bonaventure that he did not wish to select arguments in proof of God's existence but rather to bring together as many facts as possible taken from various phenomena or natural properties of created things in order to state that nature itself attests and acknowledges God

(7) These ten arguments may be briefly stated as follows:

1. Est ens posterius, ergo ens prius, ergo ens primum.
2. Est ens ab alio, ergo ens non ab alio.
3. Est ens possibile, ergo ens necessarium.
4. Est ens respectivum, ergo ens absolutum.
5. Est ens diminutum, sive secundum quid, ergo ens simpliciter.
6. Est ens propter aliud, ergo et ens propter seipsum.
7. Est ens per participationem, ergo ens per essentiam.
8. Est ens in potentia, ergo ens in actu.
9. Est ens compositum, ergo et ens simplex.
10. Est ens mutabile, ergo et ens immutabile.

« Ex his igitur decem suppositionibus necessariis et manifestis inferitur, quod omnes entis differentiae sive partes inferunt et clamant, Deum esse » (*De Mystero Trinitatis*, 1, pp. 11-20). Cfr. B. A. LUXCKX, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, op. cit., p. 258: see also F. COPLESTON, *History of Philosophy* (London, Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1950), pp. 250-252.

and that the existence of God is a truth hardly needing any demonstration or carefully elaborated proofs (8). For our Saint the existence of God is a truth beyond any doubt if man would only take the time and the trouble to look for this truth. On this point the Seraphic Doctor remains the true disciple of his Seraphic Father, St. Francis, for it was the gift of the Saint of Assisi to find God's presence in nature and everything God had created (9).

For St. Bonaventure these proofs taken as it were from creatures and from sense are proofs not because they begin primarily from sense but in so far as they imply notions belonging to the intelligible order which infer God's existence. We think that we are beginning with sensible data when we state that mutable, dependent, relative, imperfect, and contingent things exist, but in actual fact we know these deficiencies only because we are in possession of the idea of the perfect which tells us that they are insufficient. Our understanding of the contingent and imperfect implies the knowledge of the necessary. But the necessary is God. And so human reason finds out that it already has a certain knowledge of the first independent, immutable being, when it begins to prove that He exists (10). Thus, if the idea of God is innate, the world of sense cannot enable us to construct this idea but only to find it within ourselves. This idea of God must then of necessity be our real starting point, even though it is not recognized by us as such, and not the world of sense, for if we possess

(8) Cf. E. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

(9) The Saint seems to imply his desire for rest and repose in God in *De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, 1, 20, p. 47: « Si est ens mutabile, est ens immutabile: quia, secundum quod probat Philosophus, motus est ab ente quieto et propter ens quietum: si ergo ens omnino immutabile non est nisi illud ens primum, quod Deus est, cetera autem creata, eo ipso quod creata, sunt mutabilia; necesse est, quod Deum esse inferatur a qualibet entis differentia ».

(10) In *Hexameron*, V, 30, T. V, p. 359: « Fertur similiter experiendo sic: productum respectu primi defectivum est; similiter compositum respectu simplicis; similiter permixtum respectu puri, et sic de aliis; ergo dicunt privationes. Sed "privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per habitus suos". "Iudex enim est rectum sui et obliqui". Et si "omnis cognitio fit ex praeexistenti cognitione": ergo necessario intelligentia experitur in se, quod habeat aliquod lumen, per quod cognoscat primum esse ». See also *ibid.*, 32, et *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, III, 3.

within ourselves the idea of God, we are certain that He exists, because we cannot think of Him as non-existent (11). Hence the second way offered by St. Bonaventure returns to the first way, namely that the existence of God is a truth naturally innate in every rational soul, and the first way opens the door to the third way, that is, that the existence of God is a fact immediately evident and most certain.

The Third Proof for God's Existence.

On this point, namely, that the existence of God taken and considered in itself is absolutely evident, St. Bonaventure from the beginning of his teaching career until the end of his blessed life ever remained the faithful follower of St. Anselm. Now a first principle is such that once we understand the terms in which it is stated, we immediately accept the truth of this statement. No proof is necessary. The proposition *God is* is such a statement. God is being itself. Nothing more perfect than He can be thought of and therefore we cannot think of Him as not existing for the very necessity of His being is in some way reflected in our thought (12). It could happen that one would not know what is meant by the word «God» and so being in error in regard to His essence such a one would not know the necessity of His existence. But once one does have a knowledge of the significance of the word «God» either by reason or experience (13) or by the

(11) «Ex his igitur decem suppositionibus necessariis et manifestis inferitur, quod omnes entis differentiae sive partes inferunt et clamant, Deum esse. Si ergo omne tale verum est verum indubitabile: ergo necesse est, quod Deum esse sit indubitabile verum» (*De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, 1, 20, p. 47).

(12) «We are thinking of a being which is necessary, and which is the greatest only because it is necessary; and because it is necessary we cannot think that it does not exist. But necessity implies existence. And for that reason the greatest being of which we can think and beyond which we cannot conceive anything greater must exist- or it is not the greatest being which can be conceived» (P. BOEHNER, *St. Bonaventure, op. cit.*, p. 105).

(13) St. Bonaventure introduces his argument in the *Hexameron*, V, 31, T. V, p. 359: «Sic igitur, his praesuppositis, intellectus intelligit et dicit, primum esse est, et nulli vere esse convenit nisi primo esse, et ab ipso omnia habent esse, quia nulli inest hoc praedicatum nisi primo

tenents of faith (14), or if one takes into consideration the innate idea of God given to all men (15), then the necessary existence of this divine being in itself becomes a necessity for our thought and we cannot think of Him as not existent (16).

It may be safely stated that St. Bonaventure was strongly attracted by the argument of St. Anselm for God's existence and tended toward a further simplification of this argument, direct and forward as it had already been stated by the Benedictine Saint. In his work, the *Proslogion*, St. Anselm through a closely bound dialectical process makes the mind posit God as the being than which no greater can be conceived. The argument may be briefly formulated as such: «The concept which everyone has of God is that of a most perfect being; greater being cannot be conceived. Consequently God must also really exist; otherwise He would no longer be that most perfect being, for He would lack real existence». For St. Anselm the contents of the definition of God had to be unfolded in order to arrive at the conclusion contained therein, namely, that God must necessarily exist. For the Seraphic Doctor, the same definition of God becomes an immediate evidence, because this definition of God participates in the necessity of its content and need not be unfolded in order to prove God's existence. In other words, once we are cognizant of what the word «God» means, we are also aware of His existence. St. Bonaventure states: *Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divini esse quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis, quid est quod per nomen Dei dicitur* (17). Thus it is that the

esse. Similiter simplex esse est simpliciter perfectum esse: ergo est quo nihil intelligitur melius. Unde Deus non potest cogitari non esse, ut probat Anselmus».

(14) *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, I, 1, 21, T. V, p. 47.

(15) In *I Sent.*, 8, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, 1 fund., T. I, p. 153: «Est quod sic, videtur per Anselmum, qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed maius est quod non potest cogitari non esse, quam quod potest: ergo cum Deo nihil maius cogitari possit, divinum esse ita est, quod non potest cogitari non esse».

(16) Cf. E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 126 sq.

(17) In *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, Concl. See also *ibid.*: «Nam Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse quo nihil majus cogitari potest:

mind thinking of this divine being becomes cognizant of the necessity of its existence and so the very definition of God becomes a proof of His existence. The formula can be made still more simple, for if we say that God's existence is based upon the intrinsic evidence which human reason has of the idea of God, it should be sufficient to put this idea before our minds to guarantee seeing its necessity. In the words of St. Bonaventure «If God is God, God exists». If the antecedent is evident, and according to St. Bonaventure it is, then the conclusion is also evident (18).

At this point it must be remembered that the above argument, as exposed by St. Anselm and by St. Bonaventure is valid for God alone and for no other being. To put forth an objection as was proffered against St. Anselm in regard to an island greater than which could not be conceived and on this account must necessarily exist is not to understand completely the question or the problem involved. The statement «a being such than no greater can be conceived» when it is applied to God offers no contradiction between subject and predicate. When this proposition is applied to an island or some other object we are positing a contradiction, for by definition an island or any other object outside of God is limited and as such is imperfect. The existence of such could not be proved by a definition that is at once contradictory and impossible (19).

ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto».

(18) «Si Deus est Deus, Deus est; sed antecedens est adeo verum quod non potest cogitari non esse; ergo Deum esse est verum indubitabile» (*De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, 1, 29, T. V, p. 48).

(19) «Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Anselmi de insula, qua nulla melior vel maior cogitari potest; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia, cum dico ens, quo nihil maius cogitari potest, hic nulla est repugnantia inter subiectum et implicationem; et ideo rationabiliter potest cogitari; hic est repugnantia inter subiectum et implicationem. Insula enim dicit ens defectivum, implicatio vero est entis perfectissimi; et ideo, quia ibi est "oppositio in adiecto", irrationabiliter cogitatur, et intellectus sibi ipsi in cogitando repugnat; et ideo non est mirum, si non potest inferri, quod istud quod cogitatur sit extra in re. Secus autem est in ente vel in Deo, cui non repugnat talis implicatio» (*De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, 1, ad 6, T. V, p. 50).

St. Bonaventure did not fail to see the great and infinite distance separating human reason from such an object but as has been already stated one being even infinitely remote from another in the order of being does not prevent if from being present to it in the order of knowledge. It suffices that such beings be analogous in nature, even though they do not share the same nature in the same degree or even if these natures are infinitely separated from each other. In regard to God and the human soul we have two intelligibles, and human reason, limited as it may be, can comprehend the identity of the idea of God's essence with the identity of His existence. It suffices that the idea of God be in us, and once we possess this idea, we posit the existence of God. There is no passage from the order of thought to the order of reality. There is nothing to be filled in between the idea of God whose « existence is necessary and this same God necessarily existing » (20).

Summary of Proofs.

We may thus say that the problem reduces itself to the question as whether or not God is an object proportionate to our thought. There should be no difficulty on this point, if we could be spared from the mistake of conceiving intellectual knowledge as analogous to sense knowledge. In sense knowledge the action which affects the sense is something generally from without. The sense does not enter within itself to determine its object — rather it tends outward — it becomes dispersed in the object which specifies it. Intellectual knowledge is entirely different. It is from within; the object of our intellectual knowledge penetrates the mind, aids it, and helps the exercise of its operation. St. Bonaventure offers a helpful comparison on this point. He states that in the hypothesis that mountains gave man the strength necessary to carry them, man would carry a larger mountain with more ease and facility than a smaller one, because the larger mountain would give him more strength and energy than the

(20) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

smaller one: just so, the divine intelligible aids man's reason to know it in proportion to its immensity and this divine intelligible helps man's reason all the more since it is for man's knowledge not an exterior object, existing outside of his mind, but an interior object concerning which human reason may recollect itself and so obtain strength (21). Thus it is the shining forth or the irradiation of the divine object itself in the interior and depth of man's soul that forms the metaphysical foundation for man's very knowledge of God and it is in the order of being and of being alone that the *Ratio Anselmi* as it was called by the Scholastics and St. Bonaventure's treatment of this argument is to find its ultimate justification.

Having understood this, we may now more fully conceive how in the mind of St. Bonaventure the argument of St. Anselm is practically identified with the argument offered by St. Augustine for the existence of truth. This is so, because to affirm any individual truth is necessarily to affirm the existence of God upon whom all truth is founded (22). This is even more evidently seen if instead of stating a particular truth, one would affirm the existence of truth in general. Even in the

(21) « Ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, quia sensus potest corrumpi, intellectus autem non. Cuius ratio est, quia sensus dependet ab organo, in quo est quaedam medietas et harmonia, quae non tantum corrumpitur per contrarium, sed per excellens; sed intellectus non dependet ab organo, quia est vis immaterialis, ideo non tristatur in excellenti. Ex parte obiecti non est simile, quia obiectum intelligibile excellens iuvat et confortat, quia influentia talis cognoscibilis procedit ab intimis et intrat ipsam potentiam, et ideo ipsam confortat et corroborat. Sicut si magnus mons daret virtutem portandi se, facilius ferretur quam parvulus; sic est in intelligibili, quod Deus est. Sensibile autem obiectum tantum extra excitat, et ideo hoc corrumpit, illud autem non » (in *I Sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 1 ad 2, T. I, p. 39).

(22) « Probat iterum ipsam (scil., existentiam Dei) et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito ponitur veritas quae est causa omnis veri » (in *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, Concl., T. I, p. 155). See also *De Mystero Trinitatis.*, I, 1, ad 5, T. V, p. 50 and also the following text in *Hexaemeron* X, 11, T. V, p. 378: « Deum esse primum, manifestissimum est quia ex omni propositione tam affirmativa quam negativa, sequitur Deum esse, etiam si dicas: Deus non est, sequitur: si Deus non est, Deus est; quia omnis propositio infert se affirmativam et negativam, ut si Socrates non currit, verum est Socratem non currere ».

very denial that truth exists one is declaring that something is true, namely, the truth of the statement that truth does not exist. If this is true, then something must be true and if this one statement is true, then the first truth or God exists. If God is present in the human soul by the very affirmation of the truth we find therein, how could the human mind deny Him His existence? If all we know is by the very light of God how could we posit in the name of that light that this first light is not existent? (23). «This radical impossibility of denying God is therefore the effect upon the face of our soul by the divine light» (24). Hence the proofs offered by St. Bonaventure for the existence of God support one another. Further they are so closely related that it does not seem possible to separate them one from the other. In returning to the origin of any one of them, we constantly come to the same starting point, namely, that there exists a relationship between the soul and God. God manifests Himself in the soul. He is present in the very truth that the soul apprehends. God is more close to the soul than the soul is to itself. In brief, the soul possesses a natural aptitude to perceive God (25); it desires God, ever seeking Him in its endeavors for happiness, peace, and goodness.

At this point it is well to remember the teaching of St. Bonaventure that went before in regard to the soul and to its faculties. The intellect and reason, as has been stated, are not separated from the soul as substance and accident but belong to the same genus as does the soul, namely, substance, but *per reductionem*. They are consubstantial with the soul. Such a relation makes the soul present to itself; it is able to recognize in itself the image with which the Creator endowed

(23) «Intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem, ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare, non esse primam lucem sive veritatem: ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare, primam veritatem non esse» (in *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 4, T. I, p. 153).

(24) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

(25) «Omnes enim hae quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc: Quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui» (in *I Sent.*, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, concl., T. I, p. 41).

it. If this is so, and according to the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor it is, then the human reason is not a nucleus of white light casting or throwing out its rays and beams over objects to recognize and outline their contours, but it is rather the direct movement of an intelligible substance, which is the human soul, and this human soul is rendered intelligible by the never ending presence of the divine action and influence (26).

For the Seraphic Doctor, then, the idea of God is innate. Human reason does not construct this idea but rather discovers it. Such an idea which comes neither from things nor from ourselves must come from God and so for the Seraphic Saint of the Franciscan School the simplest explanation of this idea of God existing in the human intellect is God Himself. It is the mark and seal of God upon man, the creation of God. Man in return attests irrefutably to the existence of this idea by his every search for peace, happiness, and truth. St. Bonaventure distinguishes carefully by saying that it is possible for man to be in error or ignorance regarding God's nature but he cannot be in ignorance concerning His existence, for the knowledge we have of God and of His existence is inseparable from our thought. Moreover, it is the very being, God Himself, who moves man's intellect to know Him and to discover His existence. If we admit the theory of illumination, we must admit the innate knowledge of God's presence in our intellect. We possess this knowledge not in an immediate vision of the Divine Essence but in the impossibility of denying the existence of the Supreme Being. As soon as we understand correctly the word « God », we have the knowledge of God's existence.

(26) Cf. E. GILSON, *op cit.*, p. 136.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to show the relation of human reason to God's existence and nature. In so doing it was necessary to speak of the greatness of man's faculties, namely, his intellect and will, and to state that he alone of God's earthly creation knows why he acts. He acts for an end, for a purpose, and must seek the Being who is his ultimate end and happiness. If he seeks this Being, he must know it. This is precisely the question that we have treated, as we have studied and we have followed the Seraphic Doctor in solving the question: How does finite reason know the one Being who alone is infinite?

For St. Bonaventure the terms « reason » and « intellect » denote the same intellectual faculty. It is this rational faculty in man which thinks and which reasons. Even if at times it is designated by different names to describe its various functions, namely, called the *ratio* or the *intellectus*, it is to be understood as this one faculty of the soul. Thus through reason the soul compiles, gathers, and collects; through the intellect it knows itself and spiritual substances, for the intellect is ordained to contemplate separated spiritual substances. The difference between the two would seem to be that the term *ratio* is used more with regard to discursive knowledge, while the term *intellectus* is employed for self-reflection and contemplation.

Each of these is again divided. The reason is divided into the superior and the inferior reason and the intellect into the possible and the active. The *ratio superior* and the *ratio inferior* signify two different activities of the one rational or knowing faculty. The difference is not one of nature, but it is one of operation or of activity. The superior reason turns

to what is above itself, and in so doing is illumined and purified. It contemplates the immutability and eternal laws of divine virtue. Its very activity suggests that it be called *ratio superior*. When this faculty of reason turns to what is beneath itself, it is weakened and drawn toward it. It becomes inferior in turning to what is beneath its dignity, and so it rightly receives the name *ratio inferior*. The two, superior reason and inferior reason, are of the same nature; they differ only according to the disposition of strength or weakness. The active intellect and the possible intellect are two differences of the same intellectual potency. They concur inseparably in one complete operation of knowing. The possible intellect is not entirely passive; neither is the active intellect completely active. St. Bonaventure states that it is the possible intellect that turns to the intelligible present in the sensibles species and abstracts it with the aid of the active intellect. The active intellect and the possible intellect are interdependent; they concur in one act of abstracting the intelligible species. « They are two reciprocal movements in conjunction with a single operation » (1). They are two aspects of the same faculty, « two simple differences of function within a single substance and two correlative aspects of the same operation » (2).

The term « reason » may be taken by itself. Abstracting from the various ways in which it is used, it may be stated that it is the function of reason to consider universal ideas, to abstract from the realm of phenomena and sense, and to break the limitations set by place, time and space.

Man is a composite of body and soul. His body is the most noble organization in created nature. Yet it is his rational soul which places him above all of God's terrestrial creation. It is because of this rational soul that man is elevated, ennobled, and receives the dignity which is his due. The soul is the form of the body. It has being, life, and intelligence. It imparts these to the soul. The soul enjoys liberty and is destined to live forever. St. Bonaventure states that the soul is a substance composed of matter and form.

(1) E. GILSON, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

(2) In *II Sent.*, d. 24, a. 2, q. 4, p. 564.

It does not need the body to be constituted as a substance; it is already a *hoc aliquid* (3).

The body and the soul of man are two complete constituent principles; they are incomplete in respect to the perfection which regards their composition. Each seeks the perfection of the other by a natural inherent appetite. Each is complete in its own genus; yet from the union of body and soul there results a new complete substance. Such is man's rational nature. He is a being made to the image and likeness of God. Born in time, he is destined to live forever. Because he is such, he must direct his every act to God. For this he uses the judicatory power of his intellect. He judges whether an act is in conformity to his nature or not, whether an act is right or wrong. Man acts according to his conscience.

St. Bonaventure says that conscience is a habit of the cognoscitive faculty, namely, the intellect. It is a habit perfecting the intellect in the practical order, for it is destined toward action. It dictates the course of action to be followed. Although it is a directive and ruling norm, conscience is not a faculty of the will or of the appetite in man, but belongs to the practical intellect. It is distinguished from will and appetite.

Conscience is both an acquired and an innate habit. It is innate, by reason of the light with which it has been endowed and by reason of the first moral principles with which it is impressed. It is an acquired habit, because of the cognoscible species which it can acquire and because it is a rule of action destined for operation. This natural light impressed upon the soul is called the *naturale judicatorium*. It directs the soul

(3) « Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, tenens... quod anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri, quod habet intra se fundamentum suae existantiae et principium materiale, a quo habet existere, et formale a quo habet esse » (in *II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, II, pp. 414-415). According to the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, individuation is due partly to matter and partly to form and it is the union of both of these principles that constitutes the individual as such. Cfr. *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, II, 109: « Quod sit aliquid, habet a forma, individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae. Individuatio igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio ».

in forming judgments of both cognoscible and operable things. It is because of this light that primary principles are said to be innate in us. Moral principles are likewise innate because of this judicatory power. In order to know particular conclusions, however, this light does not suffice. For these there is need of a certain persuasion and a new indwelling. Thus conscience implies a direct habit of judgment; it implies operation.

St. Bonaventure maintains that if we know things through their essences and not through their species, and he says that we do have such knowledge, then in regard to these, conscience can be called a habit *simpliciter* innate. Such knowledge would be to know and to love God. It is not acquired through a similitude obtained from the senses but is present essentially in man's soul. Thus the Seraphic Doctor states that not all cognition begins with the senses. The soul knows God and itself without any admixture of the exterior senses. To the statement of Aristotle that all cognition begins with the senses, he answers that this assertion must be understood of those things which have their being in the soul through an abstract similitude. When Aristotle calls the soul a *tabula rasa*, he does not mean that there is no knowledge in the soul, but that there is no picture or abstract similitude in the soul. How then does reason know and primarily how does it know God?

The Seraphic Doctor says that man's knowledge of corporeal things begins with the senses. Through the five exterior senses man comes into contact with the outside world. The interior senses also aid in the process of cognition, but human knowledge is not perfected until it comes to the intellect which truly recognizes it as a thing. The possible intellect co-operates with the active intellect in order to separate the intelligible species from the phantasm. This act requires a judgment which St. Bonaventure calls a *dijudicatio*. For this there is needed a divine influence which acts as the mover and the regulator of our thought. This leads to the theory of illumination.

The *naturale judicatorium*, which is innate in the soul, is in contact with the eternal reasons. By means of this light the soul abstracts the intelligible species from the sense object. Yet man has knowledge of other things. For these he does

not depend on his senses. The soul knows God and itself without any admixture of the external senses. Man reaches God through his memory, intelligence, and will.

It is through the notion of being that we know God. All truth is based on being. That we know something with certainty means that something really exists. God is all truth and things are true in so far as they have their foundation in God. The Divine Mind is the source of all ontological truth, and St. Bonaventure, making the necessary qualifications, says that God is also the principle of logical truth. In our judgments, there is something immutable, necessary, and infallible. These cannot be the result of the intellect, which is finite, mutable, and contingent. There is something above the mind. It is a divine influence. We know the perfect and the positive. We know something absolute; we posit perfections in God, even though our minds attain only the contingent and the mutable.

There are two factors in every act of cognition, the eternal rules which are the regulators and the movers of our thought and the created intellect. The eternal rule is not seen in its totality but only partially. It is *contuita*. For certain knowledge there must be immutability on the part of the object and infallibility on the side of the knower. As is evident, this can only be verified in God. Yet in every judgment of man, this immutability and infallibility must be found. How is this brought about?

Through his superior reason, man is in contact with the eternal reasons, with God. Because he is an image of God, he is capable of knowing God. He only enjoys a partial vision of the eternal rules; he sees them but dimly; yet they are the regulators of his thought, «because they force the restless uncertainty and mutability of our thought under an inevitable law» (4). The eternal reasons are movers of our thought, for superior reason seeing the finiteness of created things is moved toward the eternal idea which is but dimly perceived. These eternal reasons enable man to obtain certain cognition of objects which surpass the capacity of the mind and which are

(4) P. BOEHNER, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

common to all men. Thus there is a light leading man to certain cognition; it is a divine illumination shining dimly through creatures. It is not intuition; it is contuition. Does man know this light? If he does, then he knows God, for this light is the divine mind aiding man to obtain certainty in his judgments.

Being is the primary notion of our mind. Without being nothing can be understood. In order to know the « nothing », we must know that something exists. It is the idea of being which first comes to our mind. This being must be the purest, the most actual being. « Moved by it and forced by its unerring light, the mind becomes aware of that being which is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be » (5). This being is present for everyone, even though it be seen but dimly and faintly. It is there, although we may be unaware of its presence. Hence the existence of God cannot be doubted. It is inserted in our souls. It is proclaimed by every creature. The proposition « God exists » is most certain and most evident.

St. Bonaventure offers other proofs for the certainty of God's existence. These proofs are adduced from the contingency, necessity, limitation, and participation of other beings. He accepts St. Anselm's argument and unites it with his own theory of illumination. For the Seraphic Doctor, the proofs drawn from the external world proclaiming God's existence are not of primary importance. They enable us to recognize the immediacy of our knowledge of God. If we think, says the Saint, and are conscious of what the word « God » means, we cannot deny His existence. *Si Deus est Deus, Deus est.*

This, then, shows the sublimity of the thought of St. Bonaventure. It was his gift to contemplate God, the Being whose existence could not be denied. For St. Bonaventure, the fact that God exists is a truth deeply impressed on the hearts of all men. If they use their intellects, they can easily discover the relation of their minds to this Supreme Being. He has been called the Seraphic Doctor, and seraphic he was in the thought that the existence of God was a truth written on the very

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 103.

hearts of men. «Thou hast signed us with the light of thy countenance» (6).

It can be correctly stated and maintained without any fear of contradiction that the Seraphic Doctor is one of the most attractive figures and personalities not only in Christian Philosophy but in the history of philosophy in general. He is definitely an Augustinian thinker and follows in the great tradition of the Bishop of Hippo. Although he does not ascend the heights of originality reached by his master nor does his manner of expression approach that of St. Augustine, nevertheless, he is of this school and to his credit must be added the fact that in St. Bonaventure has been found a system of thought that is logical and follows point for point (7). His doctrine must be studied as whole in order to be fully and completely grasped. The student must see the general purpose and economy of his doctrine in its entirety or he will grasp none of it. Neither would the historian of philosophy be led by the understanding of a part of this philosophy to seek to understand the whole, for the fragments would be almost meaningless by themselves, since each part of the philosophy of St. Bonaventure reaches out and extends to all the rest of his system. It is only by studying the whole of his doctrine that his particular theses are understandable. This might perhaps be the reason why at times the doctrine of St. Bonaventure has been misunderstood and ungrasped by the best-informed thinkers (8). Thus scholasticism of the thirteenth century reached its heights in two great and powerful summits,

(6) Ps. 4, 7.

(7) Cf. B. A. LUYCKX, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, op. cit., p. 113: «Denn Bonaventura hat sich in die Systeme seiner Lehrer hineingedacht, sie klar aufgefasst und gezeichnet, hat selbst ein logisches, abgerundetes System aufgebaut; je länger man sich darin forschend und betrachtend versenkt, desto klarer steigt es in seinen Teilen und Fügungen vor dem Geiste auf. Die Lösung der berührten Schwierigkeit wird erst ein erstes Kapitel des Zweiten Teiles geboten werden, um Wiederholungen zu vermeiden. Doch sei hier im voraus festgestellt, dass Bonaventura diese Schwierigkeit seinem Systeme entsprechend gelöst hat». See also J. M. BISSEN, *L'exemplarisme divin selon Saint Bonaventure*, op. cit., pp. 12-13, P. L. DE CARVALHO e CASTRO, *Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, Gabriel Beruchene, Editeur, 1923), pp. 180-181.

(8) E. GILSON, op. cit., p. 479 sq.

two peaks within Christian thought, the one constructed by St. Thomas Aquinas and the other by St. Bonaventure. If we consider the structure built by St. Bonaventure, we find that it is unique and completed. It was the ultimate issue of a tradition and tendency which had no further end or goal to reach. « We may say that with St. Bonaventure the mystical synthesis of medieval Augustinianism was fully formed, just as that of Christian Aristotelianism was fully formed with St. Thomas. Like all the great systems, each impresses us as something complete and final in itself yet as capable of endless development by reason of its power of assimilating new elements of reality » (9).

The closer the student comes to the interior dispositions that St. Bonaventure demands for the study of philosophy the better and more clearly shall he understand the meanings of the formulas which the Saint employs and the reasons for the ways which he chooses. The intellect is for St. Bonaventure an instrument and a means of salvation and nothing besides. Thus the philosophy of the Saint treats of man as man. Like St. Augustine he refused to deal with any problem in a purely speculative and abstractive manner. It was man in his natural condition here upon earth, man in his concrete existence that was to be considered, man elevated to the supernatural state redeemed by Christ (10). It is Christ who becomes the center

(9) E. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, *op. cit.*, p. 490. See the excellent tribute given to the Seraphic Doctor by P. J. Mc ANDREW, *The Theory of Divine Illumination in St. Bonaventure*, in *The New Scholasticism*, VI (1932), 50: « Saint Bonaventure's epistemology was a real contribution to medieval philosophy. He was the first, since the time of Saint Augustine, to develop a theory of knowledge complete in both its metaphysical and psychological aspects. He went further than any of his predecessors in the attempt to incorporate the doctrine of the active and the possible intellects and of abstraction into the Augustine doctrine of Divine Illumination. By virtue of such a contribution, Saint Bonaventure holds a leading place among the men of the thirteenth century who undertook the task of adapting the newly discovered Aristotle to traditional Christian thought »

(10) Cf. Prologue to the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*. See also M. DE BENEDICTIS, O.F.M., *The Social Thought of Saint Bonaventure* (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press), p. 266: « As the basis of all his writings there underlies his one main theme: the ordering of all things to God, the central Being whence they come—the *Reduc-*

of his doctrine and teaching and on nothing whatsoever can a Christian think or speculate as he would if he were not granted the gift of faith (11). Hence the Seraphic Doctor enumerates certain necessary dispositions before man can ascend the heights of speculation.

The first disposition is a profound reverence for God and for truth, acknowledging in all humility and sincerity the infinite distance that separates God from man (12). It is from this feeling for the glory and majesty of God that the Seraphic Doctor draws and applies throughout his works the argument *ex pietate*, an argument which the reader finds many times in the writings of the Saint and of which St. Bonaventure is not ashamed (13). It is this reverence and love for God which constitutes true wisdom.

The second requirement or disposition for the correct approach to philosophy is sanctity of life, which means discipline of the mind and of man himself. It means the education

tio. Thoroughly imbued with this Theo-centric thought, the outstanding characteristic of all his writings, the Franciscan Doctor refuses to center his attention on man as the inhabitant of earth alone, but invariably reverts to the concept of man as destined for heaven ».

(11) « Le Christ est au centre de sa doctrine comme il est au centre des personnes divines, au centre de tout les sciences, et au centre même de l'univers, puisque médiateur entre Dieu et les hommes. Ces considérations, il les développe dans la première de ses conférences in *Hexameron*, preuve manifeste qu'il avait pleinement conscience de leur importance » (J. FR. BONNEFOY, *Le Saint-Esprit et Ses Dons selon Saint Bonaventure*, op. cit., p. 162).

(12) « Primum omnium necesse habes, anima mea, altissime, piissime et sanctissime de optimo Deo sentire, certa videlicet fide credendo, attenta mente considerando et perspicaci rationis intuitu cum admiratione perspicendo » (*De Regimine Animae*, I, 1, p. 128). Cf. *Breviloquium*, I, 2, T. V, p. 211; *De Mystério Trinitatis*, I, a. 2, T. V, p. 55 sq.; *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, III, 5, T. V, p. 469.

(13) « Pietas nihil aliud est quam pia, primae et summae originis pius sensus, pius affectus et pius famulatus. Summum bonum non potest haberi nec coli sine pietate. Naturaliter res tendit ad suam originem: lapis deorsum... Deiformis est creatura rationalis, quae potest redire super originem suam per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; et non est pia, nisi refundat se super originem suam. Ideo dixi, quod pietas nihil aliud est quam pia, primae et summae originis pius sensus, pius affectus et pius famulatus. Prima igitur exercitatio pietatis consistit in reverentia venerationis divinae » (*De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, III, 5, T. V, p. 469).

of the intellect and the formation of moral character (14). For this sanctity a life of prayer is necessary (15).

The third disposition for the attainment of the science of philosophy is meekness, the willingness and the ability to hear others, not in order to quarrel or engage in heated dispute, but to learn and to discover the truth (16).

The fourth and last requirement is a humble submission in faith, for this gift of God keeps man from pride which is the cause and often leads to error. Thus it is clear that the Saint is concerned with the correct attitude by which man comes to the study of philosophy and to speculation about the great, important, and serious problems which concern himself and mankind. If he possesses these qualities, then he can safely reach the ultimate end of his philosophy, which too is the final goal of all knowledge, namely, the union with God and the tasting of His goodness (17). For the Franciscan Saint in his journey toward knowledge, truth was his guide and love his animating force (18). Nothing perhaps could express the union of this truth and love in him than the title which posterity itself has willed to give to him, namely, the title of «The Seraphic Doctor».

(14) «Disciplina autem duplex est: scholastica et monastica sive morum; et non sufficit ad habendam sapientiam scholasticam sine monastica; quia non audiendo solum, sed observando fit homo sapiens. Unde in Psalmo de sapientia: Bonitatem et disciplinam et scientiam doce me. Scientia enim non habetur, nisi praecedat disciplina; nec disciplina, nisi praecedat bonitas; et sic per bonitatem et disciplinam inest nobis scientia» (*Hexaemeron*, II, 3, T. V, p. 337).

(15) «Scitis, si aliquis habet haurire aquam, libentius haurit eam ab originali suo principio quam a rivulo. Ideo, si Dominus est doctor magnus et donator doni (scientiae), de quo intendimus loqui; oportet, quod recurramus ad fontem illam ad illuminationem consequendam. Sic fecit psalmista, sic fecit Salomon et factus est clericus magnus. In principio oportet quod levemus animas nostras et regemus largitorem bonorum...» (*De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, IV, 1, T. V, p. 473).

(16) «Quando aqua est quieta, tunc homo videt in ea bene faciem suam; sed quando est turbata, tunc nihil potest videre. Ita, quando homo est in ira, tunc non videt veritatem. Contentiosi intelligentiam impediunt in se et in aliis. Iratus etiam pertinaciter defendit falsum» (*De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, VIII, 4, T. V, p. 494).

(17) «Et hic stare debet omnis mediatio nostra, quia hic est finis omnis cognitionis et operationis, et est sapientia vera, in qua est cognitio per veram experientiam» (*De Triplici Via*, I, 4, 18, T. VIII, p. 7).

(18) «Scientia inflat, sed caritas aedificat; ideo oportet iungere cum scientia caritatem» (*De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, IV, 24, T. V, p. 478).

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